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INTRODUCTION 
The EU can be thought of as the biggest laboratory of intercultural collaboration of today’s 
world (Hofstede, 1991). In 1994 the Killilea report of the European Parliament (1994, 
explanatory statement par. 6) said that an ‘estimated 40 million Community citizens speak a 
language other than the nine official European Community languages and the two national 
languages, Irish and Letzeburgesch. This represents one person in eight. In addition, 12 million 
people descended from immigrants speak a non-European language’. Since then, accession of 
Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995 brought in new languages and cultures. 
The process of enlargement and the immigration from outside EU will further increase the 
degree of diversity, while EU institutions are being formed and profound structural changes, 
such as the process of globalisation and the evolution of a knowledge-based economy, are 
taking place. 
ENGIME intends to provide to European researchers an interdisciplinary forum that 
studies the complex relationships between economic growth and innovation and cultural 
diversity. 
ENGIME is constructed around a pattern of workshops addressing the ‘complex symbiotic 
relationship’ that Jacobs (1969, p 224) suggests to be at the core of the creative dynamic of the 
urban economies. Each workshop is multidisciplinary, and involves five dimensions of research: 
historical, cultural, economic, sociological and political. Many disciplines are represented in the 
proposing consortium and will represent a catalyst for research carried out outside the 
consortium. 
What are we all talking about? addresses the need to adopt common definitions in a sort of 
cross-disciplinary brainstorming.  
The objective is to obtain an instrument of reference that researchers, professionals, or simply 
amateurs can consult in order to obtain exhaustive definitions and thoughts on the vast questions 
related to culture, economic growth and innovation. We do not intend here to explain and 
decorticate the multiple relationships between these concepts but to create a cross-disciplinary 
base where the research can start from. In this sense, What are we all talking about? is not 
intended to be a document complete in itself, but rather as a working tool for the Network.  
The selection of the Key-Words 
The reasons for selecting Development and Culture are straightforward since they represent the 
key-issues of the network. Innovation and Conflict represent the positive and negative side of 
diversity at work. The existence of Communication across different cultures determines whether 
increasing diversity would result in more conflict  or, on the contrary, more innovation. 
Institution, Social capital, Trust and Governance are four key concepts for communities to 
restore communication across cultures. Globalisation is a current process that is leading to more 
and more contacts across cultures, and cannot be overlooked in this Network. 
We are striving to provide a multidisciplinary rather than a specialised tool to enable disciplines 
to speak to each other. The exercise was not without problems. In fact, some interesting lessons 
can be drawn from the difficulties we faced in this preliminary phase of ENGIME. 
•  We faced the problem of being too specialised and concentrated on one aspect of the 
concept, for example, growth can be interpreted widely in economics terms but will leave 
out some interesting sociological aspects.  6 
 
•  Some words are not explicitly dealt with some disciplines and finding their significance 
requires therefore an extra effort. 
•  The need to include different section within each definition became obvious as some aspects 
of the definition needed to be ‘treated apart’ or further explained in the purpose of clarity. 
•  The order of the concepts also became very important as we realised that the 
interconnection between the definitions meant we had to be careful not to be repetitive.  
•  The importance of involving different disciplines in the process of this glossary, apart from 
the obvious aspect of creating a multidisciplinary tool, stems also from the constructive 
critical side of this exercise, and hopefully reaching a rather exhaustive, accurate and 
entertaining analysis. 
The patterns of workshops in ENGIME 
Cultural diversity entails costs and benefits. On the cost side, a common culture and a common 
language allows individual to interact (and trade) more easily: a contract need not be translated 
if two individuals speak the same language. Moreover, often, cultural diversity may lead to 
cultural shocks and conflicts. On the benefit side, skills and knowledge are often culture-
specific: Individuals with different cultural backgrounds have different skills, expertise and 
experiences. If these are relevant to each other, cultural diversity creates an environment in 
which the gains from complementarities can be significant, provided that there exists enough 
communication across individuals. 
Cities offer a natural laboratory for analysing diversity at work. Cities are the places where costs 
(for example in the form cultural and racial conflicts) and benefits (for example in the form of 
cross-cultural knowledge spillovers that foster the processes of innovation and assign to cities a 
central role in the process of economic growth) of diversity show up. Whether benefits or costs 
prevail will depend on the degree of cross-cultural communication and cross-cultural 
complementarities. 
Based on this framework, six themes have been selected by ENGIME partners to be covered in 
the workshops. The six themes have been widely discussed among ENGIME partners and we 
believe they allow covering in an efficient manner the issues at stake. However, interaction 
among partners and with policy world will be used, if needed, to redefine on the final topics and 
their sequencing during the network’s lifetime. 
The six themes define a pattern of workshops around the ‘complex symbiotic relationship’ that 
Jacobs (1969, p. 224) suggests to be at the core of the creative dynamic of the urban economies.  
Workshops will cover the following themes. Workshop 1 (WKS1) Mapping and measuring 
diversity  studies where Europe and its cities stand in terms of cultural diversity and how this is 
reflected in social-economic structures. WKS2 Communication studies the form of 
communication. WKS4 (Conflict) studies the costs of breaking communication down in terms of 
social exclusion. WKS5 (Trust and social capital) studies trust and social capital and how 
communication  may be restored or reinforced. WKS7 (Governance)  studies the forms of 
governance that help to minimise costs and maximise benefits of cultural diversity. WKS6 City 
as source of growth studies knowledge spillovers, a possible way of realising the potential 
benefits of cultural diversity once communication is restored.  7 
 
1.  DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH 
1.1 Definition 
Economic development refers to the growth process of the production of goods and services 
given a certain population. Following Perroux (1961), scholars often distinguish between the 
concepts of ‘growth’, ‘development’ and even ‘economic advancement’. 
‘Growth’ usually means simple increase in production, ‘development’ implies underlying 
structural change as well; and ‘economic advancement’ adds the idea of broader social and 
cultural transformation or change. Over time, two closely related strands of research have 
emerged in economics: theories of growth have their focus on advanced countries, while 
theories of development focus on issue that are more closely related to developing countries
1.  
Traditionally, theories of growth are specifically oriented to advanced countries and ignore key 
features of developing countries. Often, they have the tendency to dismiss ideas and concepts 
originating in the development field, which are often presented as non-rigorous. However, some 
of these concepts are now at the centre of more recent theories of growth such as endogenous 
growth theories (concepts such as externalities, increasing returns and other non-convexities)
2.  
1.2  Measuring growth and development 
Economic growth is traditionally measured in terms of output per capita. Several measures of 
output exist: the most common is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) In non technical terms, 
GDP is equivalent to the value of the production in one year in a country, net of intermediate 
consumption. Alternative measures are Gross National Product, where remittance of emigrants 
are also taken into account, and Gross Value Added, which include indirect and import taxes. 
The differences between all these measures are relatively small and not relevant for the purpose 
of ENGIME. GDP growth rates of developed countries are averaging at around 1.5% per 
annum.  
GDP is a synthetic, clear and understandable measure of a country’s output and it is the most 
common measure of growth. However, it leaves aside several issues that are of interest when 
comparing across countries. 
Broader measures of development have therefore been constructed, taking into account not only 
pure output, but also factors such as life expectancy, educational attainment. For example, the 
Human Development Index is an index produced by the United Nations Development 
Programme and covering 162 countries. It is a broader—and more controversial—measure of 
well-being than GDP per head. The HDI combines three indicators of welfare: life expectancy, 
GDP per head and educational attainment. In 2000, Norway overtook Canada for first place 
whereas Sierra Leone remained firmly at the bottom.  
In general, higher GDP corresponds to higher HDI and vice-versa: richer countries have higher 
rankings on HDI than poorer ones. Several countries, however, are ranked in surprisingly 
different places on the HDI than on a conventional ranking by GDP per head. Canada, for 
instance, comes top of the HDI in 1998 (see Chart 1.1 below). However, on the basis of 1998 
                                                        1 See also Key-Word 1 Section 4 Theories of Development. 
2 See Key-Word 1 Section 3 Theories of growth.  8 
 
figures for GDP per head, it ranks ninth. Britain ranks tenth on the HDI—above France and 




1.3 Theories  of  growth 
Theory of growth is a research strand in economic that tries to explain and model economic 
growth, measured by output growth. Theories of growth generally focus on advanced countries. 
Output growth can be explained in terms of two straightforward causes: either there are more 
workers or each worker produces more (assuming the number of hours worked per worker does 
not change). In modern economies, per capita GDP growth rates are mostly determined by 
increases in productivity (output per worker) rates rather than by increases in the labour force. 
                                                       
3 The Economist, September 26
th 2001. 
Chart 1.1: Human Development index  9 
 
In turn, productivity growth might come about through three channels:  
1)  increase in the quantity of capital available to each worker (through investment in physical 
capital);  
2)  increase in the quality of work due to better education and improved skills in the workforce 
(through investment in human capital); 
3)  technical progress, i.e. increase in the quality of capital (through investment in knowledge 
capital).  
The identification of the role played by each of these factors constitutes the main interest in the 
analysis of growth.  
Smith (1776) stated that production growth was based on a ‘virtuous circle’: the more 
production is increasing and has increased in the past, the more it will increase in the future. 
Growth of production allows an enlargement of markets and firm sizes which itself leads to an 
increase in productivity. These ideas were developed later by other economists: for example, 
Kaldor (1957) and Arrow (1962) analysed the increase in labour productivity enhanced by 
production or investment within the firm.  
According to Marx (1844) growth was driven by technical progress, endogenously determined 
by economic and social structure of a country. Schumpeter (1947) developed a model where 
technical progress is the basis of economic development. Technical progress itself was driven 
by innovations.  
After WWII, the theory of economic growth was dominated by models extending conditions 
that guarantee full employment in the short run (Keynesian analysis), to the long run. In 
particular, Harrod (1939) defines a growth rate of ‘equilibrium’ between supply and demand in 
his model. This equilibrium growth rate is ‘warranted’ and  determined by the propensity to 
save and the share of capital (K) in total output (GDP), i.e. K / GDP.  
In the 1950’s, neo-classical growth models have criticised Harrod’s model for two aspects:  
•  the assumptions that the propensity to save, the ratio capital-output (K/GDP) and the one of 
capital-labour (K/L) are constant and known; 
•  the lack of microeconomic foundations or microeconomic justifications to the main 
hypotheses of the model (in particular to the assumption of a known real wage in presence of 
unemployment).  
The main characteristic of neo-classical growth models is the assumption that market 
mechanisms, based on the flexibility of relative prices, guarantee growth in conditions of full 
employment. Solow (1956) has done seminal work in this class of model. Solow’s model is 
characterised by constant returns to scale and perfect competition. In Solow’s model growth 
comes through investment: in each period individuals decide how to allocate their income to 
consumption or investment. Investment in this period increases the capital available in the next 
period, implying higher income per capita and therefore growth. The crucial point is that returns 
to capital are diminishing: successive increments of capital bring about smaller and smaller 
increments of production, an assumption needed to solve the model in conditions of perfect 
competition.  The assumption of diminishing returns to capital implies a zero steady-state long-
term growth of income per capita. In order to explain endless growth, a stylised fact about 
actual economies, neo-classical models need to assume the existence of exogenous 
technological progress that moves outward the frontier of production. Without technological 
progress, the long term growth would be nil.  10 
 
The first model to endogenise technological progress is Arrow (1962). In this model, labour 
productivity growth rate of a representative firm depends on the level of current and past 
investment made by the firm itself (learning by doing) as well as the level of investment made 
by other firms (because of the nature of ‘knowledge’ as a public good). The final result of the 
Arrow model is that the growth rate of per capita production is an increasing function of the 
population growth rate. This result is not fully satisfying because if the population was stable, 
per capita production growth rate would be zero. 
In the 1980’s, the ‘new’ endogenous growth models tried to endogenise the sustained 
accumulation of factors including human and knowledge capital. They pay particular attention 
to the micro-foundations of the accumulation process, i.e. to the private and social costs and 
benefits of investing in physical capital (capital goods), human capital (education, skills) or 
knowledge capital (technological progress).  
The different strands of endogenous growth theories fall within two branches: the first, initiated 
by Lucas (1988), stressing the importance of accumulation of human capital, and the second, 
initiated by Romer (1986), emphasising the importance of sustained innovation.  
In order to be able to save the perfect competition characteristics of Solow’s model and explain 
endless growth, they introduce a gap between private and social costs and benefits:  
•  In Lucas’s type of model the private effort of individuals to improve their own skills also 
improve the productivity of other workers;  
•  In Romer’s type of models, the private efforts of firms to innovate and gain a temporary 
monopolistic rent, also increases the stock of public knowledge; 
ie, private returns to investment are diminishing (consistently with standard economic 
assumptions), but social returns are not and growth can be sustained endlessly. The gap between 
private and social costs and benefits also implies that market allocation may not be optimal, 
allowing for the possibility of policy intervention: policies that favour investment in RandD and 
education are shown to influence permanently the economic growth rate.  
As a consequence, ideas and concepts originating in the development field (such as the 
existence of spillovers effects and increasing returns, the attention to education), which were 
often presented as non-rigorous are experiencing a new interest in growth theory.  
1.4  Theories of development 
While theories of growth have their focus on advanced countries, theories of development focus 
on issues that are more relevant to developing countries.  
In economic history ‘development’ and ‘growth’ have almost the same (measurable) meaning: 
self-sustained increase of per-capita output. This definition is not different from the one used in 
economic theory. This coincidence of meanings is likely to be due to the low starting levels of 
material output in pre-industrial societies. Despite the convergence in its quantitative definition, 
the term development involves a broader range of issues than growth and no agreement has 
been reached on its explanation and drivers. 
Several explanations of development have been put forward in the literature. They are briefly 
summarised below. 
Theories and historical analysis of the process are increasingly oriented toward non-material 
factors (‘intangibles’) (Cipolla, 1980). Explanations of the so called ‘residual factor’ are not 
satisfactory and there are many explanations about causes of one among its key component:  11 
 
technological development. Recent theories have underlined the concept of ‘technological 
creativity’ (Mokyr, 1990), strictly bounded to social and cultural factors. 
Theory of economic development has elaborated the concept of ‘creative reaction of history’, 
but the ‘father’ of this idea, Schumpeter, has translated it into a narrow sense, as an 
entrepreneurial activity of innovation (Schumpeter, 1947; Scherer, 1984). On the other hand, 
Cipolla expresses ‘creative reaction of history’ in terms of spiritual and cultural atmosphere of a 
certain period and in a certain society (trust/distrust toward future, material creativity, attitude 
towards innovation, etc.): in one word, culture in its anthropological meaning.  
The latter is being used by an economist and historian of Japanese economic transformation, 
Morishima, in a very different context from the Western-European one. The Japanese case of 
economic development, as an exception to the western civilisation rule, has induced Morishima 
to speak about the primary causes of the process (Morishima, 1982). Culture of the traditional 
society and its reset to the needs of modern economic development has been consequently 
underlined. 
Some authors start from questions such as ‘Why has Eurasia overtaken Africa and America in 
the run to development?’ (Diamond, 1997); ‘Why, has Western Eurasia overtaken the Eastern 
part?’ (Jones, 1981). What are the roots of a development oriented culture in remote times, 
owing to environmental and ecological factors? 
From Max Weber (Weber, 1958) onwards, the originality of European urbanisation process has 
been proposed as a possible answer to the second question: Medieval towns had in Europe a 
progressive role in terms of cultural milieu, political institutions and economic organisation (co-
operating and ‘horizontal’ society). 
The American institutionalist school focuses on the importance of the ‘rules of game’, such as 
property rights, protection by law of innovations, social redistribution of risks, etc. (North, 
Thomas, 1973; North, 1990). 
In general, sociology and historiography have traditionally given a great importance to religious 
beliefs, as a key area of culture affecting inclination towards economic development. Catholic 
culture was considered less suitable than Protestantism. The leading entrepreneurs of the 
industrial revolution in Great Britain were recruited from non-conformist religious sects within 
Protestantism (Payne, 1978). 
Rostow (1960) analyses national cases of economic growth and industrialisation and develops a 
chronological taxonomy that classifies countries according to their ‘stages of economic 
development’: first comers, second comers, late joiners, countries on path of development, 
backward countries. The study of development mechanisms in second comers or late joiners 
countries, has produced the concept of ‘catching up’: pursuants run faster than first comers or 
second comers. 
The analysis of national cases, within their state borders, has been criticised by Pollard, who 
describes the historical development and his diffusion as a regional process (Pollard, 1981). 
Nowadays, Rostow’s theory has been discredited: it is unable to explain how one country can 
pass from one stage to the next, and its pattern suggests the idea of universality-that every 
country, sooner or later, will pass through each stage). 
Contrasting with Rostow’s theory is the Pollard’s concept of ‘contemporaneity differential’: in 
history, unusual events (such as world wars, railways construction) may equalise countries that 
had previously been characterised by different levels of development. This concept is useful in 
studying links between developed and underdeveloped countries, demonstrated by the effect of 
the world-wide spreading of consumption pattern, or international migration patterns in the  12 
 
functioning of labour markets. Emigration can often function as a short cut along a development 
path full of obstacles. 
More recently, ‘alternative’ approaches to development have stressed the idea that no single 
path to ‘development’ can be assumed for all societies. Those approaches focus on the 
distinction between growth and development. Growth is essentially an economic concept based 
on ‘classical’ assumptions such as:  
•  the existence of an ‘homo oeconomicus’ maximising his profits and minimising his costs; 
•  the likelihood of a society in which reaching richness and welfare is an objective per se; 
•  the use of a single indicator – GDP or GNP per capita – as the measure of ‘development’;  
•  the use of the concept itself of ‘standard of living’, in which a non-economic idea (the well-
being) is transferred to the field of economic values (“well-endowed”).  
On the contrary, development is considered, by these ‘alternative’ views, as a whole, in which 
economic factors exist side by side with a concern for social, cultural, ecological, political 
aspects of life. More precisely, the Dag Hammarskijöld Foundation (1975) stated that five are 
the pillars of this new concept: the need for the satisfaction of basic needs; the need for self-
reliance; the need for eco-development; the need for an endogenous development; the need for 
structural changes.  
Basic needs are of two different types: material (food, shelter, health and so on); and immaterial 
(identity, freedom, for example): both are crucial in defining a ‘whole’ concept of development. 
Self-reliance approach refers to the need for one people to be autonomous in the practices of 
development, by first avoiding the risks of too much dependence on external inputs. 
Eco-development represents a practice and an attempt to put together the right to survival of 
people in different world contexts (synchronic solidarity) and the right of the future generations 
to live in an healthy planet, and to have equal chances to develop their societies, hopefully in an 
ecological way (diachronic solidarity).  
Endogenous development is a consequence of the self-reliance approach, in that the primary 
impulse to develop arises from the very core itself of the community, or society, and no external 
input is required for this process (or, at least, no input generating dependence).  
Last but not least, structural changes are needed where the political, economic and social 
framework of society does not correspond to people’s desire of equitable development. 
In this view, we cannot speak of development only in terms of economic development, but we 
have to encompass several aspects of man’s life, from economic security to health, from a good 
environment to the right to express political opinions, to the possibility of self-determination in 
choosing the main priorities of life. Hettne (1990) in his fundamental work, stated that 
development is a process and development studies are in search of new territories of research; 
but today there seems to be a general agreement about the need to enrich this concept. 
And yet, the very concept of ‘growth’ did not ceased to be re-worked out again and was used by 
historians and economists alike. Recently, they moved their attention from the notion of ‘self-
sustained growth’ (Landes, 1969; Arndt, 1987; Rist, 1996) to that of ‘sustainable growth’. This 
seems necessary every time that ‘development’ (economic, human, ecological) also involves 
‘growth’. Sustainability means the capacity of one complex system to persist in the long run, to 
reproduce itself and, if necessary, to grow without undermining the very properties of factors 
which have made it a functioning system. Sustainability has two interdependent specifications:  13 
 
•  A physical one (energy and, generally speaking, natural resources); 
•  An organisational one (problem-solving institutions). 
Sustainability or collapse follows from the success or failure of problem-solving institutions. 
The capacity of institutions to solve problems changes over time, suggesting that a science of 
problem-solving, and thus a science of sustainability, must be historical. 
Complexity is a primary problem-solving strategy, which is often successful in the short-term, 
but cumulatively may become detrimental to sustainability. Historical case studies (e.g. Roman 
Empire, Byzantine Empire, Europe since medieval times) illustrate different outcomes to long-
term development of complexity in problem solving. These cases clarify future options for 
contemporary societies: collapse, simplification (the strategy adopted by the Byzantine Empire 
and, during last decades, by many American firms, where simplification of management and 
elimination of costs contributed to competition and recovery), or increasing complexity based 
on increasing energy subsides (Tainter, 2000). 
Wolfgang Sachs (1992) and his colleagues developed a counter-history of development from the 
point of view of critical approaches from the South and of heterodox approaches in the West (or 
North). Their work is important in stating the right to different paths to ‘development’ for 
different peoples and cultures on the planet and, generally speaking, the right to diversity and 
non-conformist views about life. For advanced countries, this implies the necessity of a non-
ethnocentric approach towards others’ experiences. This work is also very important for its 
intellectual effort to re-examine the ‘traditional’ dictionary of the development debate, ranging 
from Help to Environment, from Needs to Planning, to Progress.  
1.5  Economic development and multicultural environments 
How can diversity affect the economy?  
On the one hand, a common culture and a common language allow individuals to interact (and 
trade) more easily: a contract need not be translated if two individuals speak the same language. 
Moreover, cultural diversity may often lead to cultural shocks and conflicts. In this case, 
diversity imposes costs to the economy. 
On the other hand, skills and knowledge are often culture-specific: individuals with different 
cultural backgrounds have different skills, expertise and experiences. If these are relevant to 
each other, cultural diversity creates an environment where the gains from complementarities 
can be significant (provided that there exists enough communication across individuals). This is 
relevant in the context of the endogenous growth theories: endogenous growth theories view 
externalities (and particularly externalities associated with knowledge spillovers) as the ‘engines 
of growth’ (Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988). To the extent that diversity positively affects 
knowledge spillovers and innovation, diversity can be read as ‘engine of growth’ itself (see 
Key-Word 3 Communication). In this case, diversity implies some benefits for the economy. 
History suggests interesting examples of the latter. In pre-industrial Europe, the first moves 
towards capitalism in the 17
th and 18
th centuries are associated with religious diversities and 
conflicts. Religious tolerance goes hand in hand with an open society, favourably disposed 
towards new ideas and innovation. This relation is proved by the experiences of countries that 
have achieved success in their economic condition: Holland, England, Sweden and the French 
region of Switzerland (Geneva). On the contrary, crisis and slackness in business are related to 
actions of ethnic and religious intolerance, such as the banishment of economically enterprising 
and well skilled social groups. Historical paradigms of this negative relation are well known:  14 
 
banishment of ‘Moriscos’ in Spain after 1609; expulsion of Jews from Iberian peninsula after 
the end of 15
th century; and of the Huguenots from France during the 16
th and the 17
th centuries. 
Between the end of the 19
th century and the First World War, the great migration of Jewish 
people from the intolerant Eastern Europe (Russia) to the tolerant United States is another 
example of the connection between economic development and acceptance of ethno-cultural 
diversity, as well as between backwardness and refusal of a multicultural social environment. 
Some economists have tried to explicitly factor diversity into economic models. Those models 
may lead to opposite results, depending on the nature of cross-cultural communication and 
complementarities assumed.  
Lazear (1995) assumes that a common culture and a common language facilitate trade between 
individuals and shows that minorities have incentives to become assimilated and to learn the 
majority language so that they have a larger pool of potential trading partners. Multiculturalism 
is a bad. In this model, individuals do not properly internalise the social value of assimilation. 
They ignore the benefits that others receive when they learn the majority language and become 
assimilated. In the absence of strong offsetting effects, policies that encourage multiculturalism 
reduce the amount of trade and have adverse welfare consequences.   
Lazear (1999) defines the global firm as a team whose members come from different cultures or 
countries. Combining workers who have different cultures, legal systems and languages 
imposes costs on the firm that would not exist with a homogeneous staff: translation costs and 
costs of transacting across borders are examples of these costs. However, complementarities 
between the workers, in terms of disjoint and relevant skills, offset the costs of cross-cultural 
dealing and justify the existence of global firms. The search for best practices is an example of 
how firms may gain from multicultural teams. Here, multiculturalism is a good. A necessary 
assumption is that communication costs between individuals from different cultures are low. 
O’Reilly et al (1997) adds the possibility of cultural conflicts. Results are different: diversity 
creates conflict so that any creativity gains are more than offset by those associated with the 
conflict itself. 
Lazear (1995), Lazear (1999) and O’Reilly et al (1997) highlight important keywords in 
modelling cultural diversity, such as communication, complementarities, conflicts, and associate 
costs and benefits. 
Discussion in Key-Word 3 Communication, Key-Word 7 Conflict further discuss the role of 
diversity in fostering or hampering growth and development. 
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2.  INNOVATION 
2.1 Definition 
Innovation is commonly understood as the act of bringing a new product into the market or the 
alteration of what is there such that it constitutes a novelty. 
4Innovation is part of the process 
through which technological change affects the productivity and the living standards of different 
societies.  
In economics the study of innovation began seriously with the work of Josef Schumpeter who 
distinguished three steps in the process of technological change: invention, innovation and 
diffusion
5.  
He was thereby drawing a distinction between the first enunciation of an idea or ‘change of the 
intellectual climate’(Wiener, 1993), its invention and the development of such an idea into a 
marketable product, innovation. These first two steps are sometimes referred to as the process of 
Research and development (R&D).  
It is often criticised that economic models of the research and development process are founded 
on a linear model which assumes that scientists do research and technologists then take over the 
development of innovations. This linear view of the R&D process fails to capture the possibility 
that the process of innovation is a complex one in which the experience arising from the 
development stage of a product may itself feed back into new inventions.  
Certainly economic theories of research and development are more suited to the analysis of the 
process of innovation and usually ignore the question under which circumstances inventions are 
more likely to appear
6. There is also a large economic literature on the diffusion of innovations 
which we will not delve into here.  
The discussion on innovation in the sections below builds up to the discussion of a recent 
economic literature that links growth and cities. Two themes emerge as important in this 
literature:  
- the factors that affect the level of investment in innovation and  
- the importance of  knowledge spillovers in facilitating innovation. 
We will look at these themes in the following sections. 
2.2 Measuring  innovation 
Given the importance of innovation an understanding of the rates of technological change is 
imperative. Specifically we would like to know not only how the rate of technological change is 
developing over time, but also how different industrial structures and institutional factors affect 
this rate.  
To answer such questions economists have attempted to measure both innovative outputs and 
flows of knowledge, emanating from the innovation process, to outsiders. The importance of 
such ‘spillovers’ in economic theories of innovation, is discussed in the following section. Here 
I briefly discuss the evidence we have about the level and the impact of knowledge spillovers.  
                                                       
4 Cf. The Oxford English Dictionary 
5 Compare the more extensive discussion in Jaffe et al. (2000). 
6 The circumstances favourable to invention are discussed by Wiener (1993)  18 
 
The measurement of technological change 
As Grilliches (1990) argues we have few good measures of the “‘underlying” rate of 
technological and scientific’ progress and are therefore bound to rely on proxy measures to 
understand something about technological change.  
The effort of firms or countries in undertaking innovation is usually measured through the 
resources devoted to Research and Development (R&D). However this provides only a measure 
of inputs to innovation. In order to understand how technology changes over time we would 
need measures of the output of the R&D process. Good measures of technological output, that 
would provide answers to questions about the pace of long run technological change, have 
remained elusive.  
Economists have repeatedly tried to use patent statistics to develop measures of technological 
output. These efforts provide a good example of the kinds of problems that afflict efforts to 
develop measures of the rate of technological change.  
Patents are issued for technological innovations and protect their owners against imitation for a 
specific period. Each patent provides information not only about the innovation covered but also 
about its relationship to previous patents and other scientific publications. As Hall et al. (2001) 
point out patent statistics therefore provide a rich record of innovative activity and have 
received a commensurate amount of attention from economists.  
Unfortunately
7 many innovations are never patented, for instance because the innovating 
persons or firms rely on secrecy to protect their ideas. Patents therefore do not provide a 
complete record of innovative activity. Other measures of innovative activity such as R&D 
expenditure at the firm level are similarly partial (Pattel and Pavitt 1995).  
As Grilliches (1990) points out the first attempts to utilize patents in economics were based on 
the assumption that they would provide a record of innovative output. However it was soon 
realized that the number of patents granted depends strongly on the level of employment at the 
granting patent office. Therefore simple time series of patent counts are not a very reliable 
measure even of research effort.  
It has also been shown that the economic “value” of individual patents varies tremendously. It 
has been argued that therefore variations in simple patent counts would provide no information 
about the rate of technological change even if the above cited problems did not exist 
(Trajtenberg 1990). This argument is challenged by those who argue that even failed research 
programs constitute important new knowledge (Pattel and Pavitt 1995). For instance a failed 
research program may clarify which research avenues are unlikely to be profitable and thereby 
narrow down the number of approaches left to investigate. Such counterarguments show how 
complex a process the creation of new knowledge is.  
To the extent to which we are interested in the sum total of existing knowledge, that can be 
turned into productive innovations, the measurement of the “value” of innovations embodied in 
a patent will matter. This can be achieved by making use of the number of citations a patent 
receives. Trajtenberg (1990) provides an interesting example of the possibilities and limitations 
of this approach. He shows that in a specific field (computer tomography) a measure of citation 
weighted patents can capture quite well the distribution of values associated with patenting in 
that field. However in order to establish this fact he needed an additional measure of 
technological output to validate his method. Without further validation in other fields and at 
other times the exact value of citation weights is difficult to establish (Hall et al. 2001).  
                                                       
7 This is unfortunate from a measurement perspective mainly.  19 
 
Capturing the ‘value’ of the measured innovative output is also a problem that afflicts other 
measures of innovative output such as the counts of innovations announced in trade journals as 
used by Feldman and Audretsch (1999).  
The efforts of economists to measure the rate of technological change are meeting with 
increasing success. However comprehensive measures that would enable us to answer the types 
of questions set out at the beginning of this section seem a long way off as yet.  
The measurement of spillovers  
As will be argued below spillovers of knowledge assume an important place in economic 
theories of innovation. We therefore review briefly the insights that empirical research provides 
into their level and effects.  
Using amongst other evidence, studies of patent citations, economists have established that:  
- significant spillovers of knowledge between firms arise;  
- spillovers are geographically localized; 
Measuring spillovers directly is almost impossible, given the nature of knowledge. An overview 
over the different attempts to establish the extent of spillovers and their effects is provided by 
Grilliches (1995). His survey shows that the literature provides evidence for quite substantial 
levels of spillovers.  
An example for this is the work by Jaffe (1986) who exploits citation patterns in patent statistics 
to establish how knowledge spills over between firms. The same source is used by Jaffe 
et al. (1993) to establish whether spillovers are geographically localized. They find evidence of 
this, although they also show that this effect weakens over time. This latter aspect of spillovers 
will be important in the discussion of theories of innovation and growth in cities.  
2.3  The economic theory of innovation 
The empirical concern with the pace of technological change has been mirrored by a theoretical 
focus on the processes that underpin technological change in a capitalist economy. Economists 
have used formal models and descriptive theories to argue about the evolution of whole 
industries affected by innovation as well as the incentives to innovate at the firm level. The 
discussion here focuses once again on the more general question of the pace of technological 
change and then turns to a discussion of spillovers and their effects.  
Determinants of the pace of technological change  
Ever since Schumpeter first pointed out the importance of technological innovation economists 
have argued about the importance of ‘competition’ in inducing innovation. Schumpeter 
suggested that much of the concern about the degree of ‘static’ competition in a market (also 
referred to as market structure) as measured by the degree of concentration in the market was 
misplaced. He argued that monopoly rents are essential if firms are to undertake the inherently 
risky activity of investing in new technologies.  
Modern economic theories of innovation have shown the relationship between innovation and 
the degree of market power to be a highly complex one (Scherer 1992). It is by no means clear 
under which market structure the incentives for firms to innovate are strongest, only that they 
are likely to be weakest under perfect competition.   20 
 
Furthermore it seems clear that market structure itself is at least partly determined by forces, 
such as the degree of technological opportunity, that also affect the pace of technological 
advance. As Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) show this means that attempts to affect the pace of 
innovation through the regulation of competition (where the latter is not directed at abuse of 
market power) are unlikely to be met with much success.  
The importance of spillovers for technological change  
While Schumpeter’s arguments have given rise to much subsequent work the terms in which he 
develops his case are conceptually vague as Scherer (1992) argues. Subsequent theoretical work 
on innovation has made much progress in this area. Specifically the analysis of the nature of 
new knowledge arising from innovation has emerged as an important focus of economic 
theorising in this field. Initially it was argued that knowledge emanating from the innovations of 
others has the properties of a public good; that is once produced it can be consumed/used by 
many simultaneously without this impinging on the value of use for any individual user (non-
rivalry) and it is not possible to exclude others from making such use of new knowledge (non-
excludability). This view of knowledge created through innovation is often attributed to 
Arrow (1962).  
The impossibility of excluding others from making some use of the knowledge created in the 
process of innovation suggests that this knowledge somehow travels from the innovator to other 
potential users; the knowledge is said to ‘spill-over’. As Arrow (1962) shows the existence of 
such spillovers dampens the incentives to invest in innovation as some of its benefits are now 
appropriated by others than the initial innovator. This suggests that the return to innovation as 
perceived by any individual innovator and society as a whole will diverge. Underinvestment in 
innovation is the consequence.  
The patent system is an institutional attempt to remedy this problem by giving innovators a 
monopoly over their innovations, such that any rival users of their innovation are essentially 
excluded from using it without the permission of the patent owner. The patent system is rarely 
perfect, but it goes some of the way to restoring the incentive to innovate.  
As Spence (1984) points out, it would be a mistake to conclude that the reduction of spillovers 
is necessarily the right way to deal with the disincentives to undertake R&D which spillovers 
give rise to. He shows that where firms undertake complementary R&D, spillovers have 
important benefits for an industry as a whole. The increased incentives to do R&D at the firm 
level, that reducing spillovers gives rise to, often do not make up for the increased costs of 
innovation at the industry level, that arise because firms no longer share innovations.  
This is a very important point as it underlines the dual nature of spillovers: as reducing 
incentives to innovate and simultaneously increasing the productivity of the research process as 
a whole. Empirical studies of high technology industries have shown that firms understand this 
point very well and sometimes actively encourage spillovers (Cockburn and Henderson 1998).  
The `public good’ view of new knowledge has also been challenged as ignoring the importance 
of investments in R&D that actually give rise to the ability to absorb  knowledge. As Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989) show innovative activity has the benefit, not only of increasing the stock of 
existing knowledge in a given firm, but also of enabling the firms’ innovators to make use of the 
innovations of others. Without their own expertise these innovators would remain unable to 
make use of information spillovers.  
This discussion of spillovers suggests that some level of spillovers is beneficial to innovative 
activity. It also suggests one reason why firms are likely to undertake less innovative activity 
than society might like.   21 
 
The discussion also indicates that conclusions about the benefits of spillovers depend crucially 
on how innovation proceeds. Spence  (1984) assumed that firms are undertaking research 
projects that are complementary. Although this is often likely to be true it is by no means 
necessary. Economic theory has little to say about how the degree of overlap between firms’ 
research interests develops over time. This would seem to be an important area for further 
investigation as the discussion in the following section will show.  
2.4 Innovation  and  cities 
There is a new and growing literature on the connection between the agglomeration of industries 
and people in cities and the growth of industries. Before turning to this literature we start with 
the theories of endogenous growth which is the basis of this latest literature.  
Theories of ‘endogenous’ growth  
The literature on ‘growth and cities’ is based on models of ‘endogenous growth’ as pioneered 
by Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). This last literature has itself been extensively criticized 
recently and this has implications for the work on cities based thereupon. The authors of the 
‘new’ growth models emphasize the importance of spillovers for the growth process. Their 
models generate growth through feedback equations that suppose that the rate of growth of new 
ideas/human capital in an economy is directly proportional to the existing stock of knowledge in 
such an economy. One can tell a story that suggests that the greater is the stock of existing 
knowledge the more possibilities for generating new knowledge are available.  
Although these models generate endogenous growth, their results are very sensitive to the exact 
formulation of the feedback rule as is pointed out by Solow (2000). This rule describes how 
existing knowledge gives rise to new knowledge. Furthermore it is open to question whether the 
implications of the new growth models stand up to empirical scrutiny. A good discussion of this 
recent literature is provided by Dowrick (2002).  
These rather critical remarks concerning endogenous growth theory are not meant to suggest 
that spillovers of technology do not matter for growth. They just show that the models we use to 
understand growth are not yet sufficiently well specified to really clarify how spillovers affect 
the growth rate of an economy.  
Cities and growth of industries  
As discussed above it has been shown that spillovers of knowledge are generally geographically 
localized (Jaffe et al. 1993). This suggests that cities may have an important role to play as 
locations at which knowledge spillovers are particularly likely to occur.  
The new literature on the nexus between the growth of industries and agglomeration of 
industries is based on the premise that this is so. It has raised some interesting issues:  
Glaeser et al. (1992) raise the question whether cities with a diversified industrial base are likely 
to grow faster than cities in which industries of one type are concentrated. The distinction is 
drawn between spillovers that arise within the same industry (also referred to as MAR
8 
spillovers) and spillovers that arise between firms in different industries (also referred to as 
Jacobs
9 spillovers). If the latter are more important then diversified cities should grow faster.  
                                                       
8 MAR are Marshall, Arrow and Romer 
9 This refers to the work of Jane Jacobs, Jacobs (1969)  22 
 
This literature may be linked to the question of complementarities between the research efforts 
undertaken by differing firms as discussed above. One way to read the work by Glaeser 
et al. (1992) is as a suggestion that complementary research is more likely to arise in diverse 
cities. This does beg the question whether there can be too much diversity leading to unrelated 
innovation and no gain from spillovers.  
The evidence brought to bear on these questions by Glaeser et al. (1992) cannot provide answers 
to them. Their data is rather coarse and open to a number of different interpretations as they 
themselves admit.  
A more recent paper by Feldman and Audretsch (1999) seems to provide better evidence in 
favour of the view that diversity leads to more productive spillovers.  
The work by Feldman and Audretsch (1999) raises the interesting question as to how likely it is 
that firms with complementary research interests locate in the same city, i.e. how likely 
beneficial diversity is. Their work suggests that the location choices of firms are influenced by 
the presence of innovators in complementary industries. 
The most detailed evidence on all of  these question to date has been amassed by 
Henderson (2001). He has constructed a panel data set of individual plants across the United 
States that allows him to test the above ideas in great detail. His results suggest that:  
MAR spillovers are strong and matter particularly for high technology industries. He also finds 
that these spillovers are highly localized, which reinforces the evidence we have to date.  
Jacobs spillovers, that arise from diversity, are weak or non existent. 
This rather negative finding regarding Jacobs spillovers is not the end of the story however. 
Duranton and Puga (2001) have developed a hypothesis according to which new products are 
overwhelmingly developed in diversified cities. Once such products are shown to work the 
firms that created these migrate to specialized cities where firms take advantage of MAR 
spillovers. The findings reported by Henderson (2001) would then seem to apply predominantly 
to plants that have been established for longer and have already migrated.  
Duranton and Puga  (2001) provide some evidence from France for the veracity of their 
hypothesis. They also discuss further evidence from other work that would seem to support their 
view. Their main point however is that both diversified and specialized cities are necessary for 
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3.  CULTURE 
3.1 Definition 
The oldest definition of the term ‘culture’ referred to the cultivation of soil or the raising of 
some plant or animal. In the Age of Enlightenment, the word was used figuratively and referred 
to the work of someone who improves his mind by reading. Another meaning appeared in the 
19th century in Germany. This new meaning came from the work of the philosopher Herder. 
According to Herder, every culture is distinguished by its ‘Volksgeist’, its original inspiration. 
In this sense, ‘culture’ is formed by the major collective and distinctive features of a people.  
The concept of culture was further developed mainly by Anglo-Saxon sociologists or 
anthropologists, who were influenced by the German tradition. In 1922, Malinowski developed 
the idea that arts, faith, rites and techniques of a society form a coherent set, and that this set 
tends to evolve very slowly. Malinowski studied the Trobriand society and demonstrated that 
their ideas on reproduction and their beliefs concerning death correspond with each other and 
form a logical set. During the 1930s, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead investigated how 
culture is embodied in the individuals by means of education. The kind of fieldwork in exotic 
cultures relativised the so-called superiority of western civilisation, which had allowed them to 
hold in contempt all non western cultures. 
Today, two different meanings of the term are most in use.  
The first of these, ‘the training, development and refinement of mind, tastes and manners’ – as 
quoted in the Oxford English Dictionary – had already began to take precedence over the old 
Latin meaning by the 1950s.  
The second, whose common usage has increased since the 19
th century, chiefly owes its 
popularity to the sciences of sociology and anthropology and is best explained by Edward 
Tylor's famous definition of 1871, in which he describes culture as ‘that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society’ (Tylor, 1994). This definition was resolutely opposed 
to that of racist theories (in, which biological factors were perceived as the cause of the variety 
of ways and customs) and to the evolutionist theories in which every people or country is placed 
on a scale ranging from savagery to high civilisation). Tyler positively states that culture is 
acquired and not inborn. He insists (in opposition to evolutionist theories) on the fact that any 
community, whatever its shape, has a genuine culture. 
In the first instance thus culture is perceived as a universal value, generally ascribed to the 
realms of cultural production such as music or art or to the scientific field, and frequently 
defined in opposition to the lack thereof. Matthew Arnold (1925) wrote that to have culture is to 
‘know the best that has been said and thought in the world’. Today, this concept is more often 
termed ‘high culture’ to indicate the artistic and cultural expressions valued by a given society's 
elite, and as such frequently opposed to popular culture. 
Tylor's definition, on the other hand, while still describing culture as a single entity, by focusing 
on the distinguishing characteristics of each social group, already carries within it the 
implication of relativity. Nevertheless, it was Franz Boas who first provided a pluralistic 
definition of culture as something that always characterises a specific group and therefore, 
similar to a group, exists only as a plurality. Thus he laid the foundations for cultural relativism, 
which rejected the developmental stages of evolutionism in favour of viewing cultures as having  25 
 
their own standards, and thus not as subjects whose value rested on the opinions of other 
cultures.  
Subsequently, the concept of culture replaced the concept of ‘race’ as the main term of 
comparison in anthropological discourse. ‘Culture’ instead of ‘race’ as the fundamental 
difference between humans was meant to be a different kind of difference: difference was no 
longer a question of descent, of heritage, of differential positioning on the steps of evolution, of 
unalterable, virtually natural-biological endowment with differential abilities. ‘Cultural 
differences are acquired differences, acquired by socialization in specific cultural contexts.’ 
(Sökefeld)  
Lévi-Strauss (1949) opposes the particularity of culture to the universality of nature, believing 
that ‘everything universal in man derives from the order of nature and is characterized by 
spontaneity, (...) while ‘everything which is subject to a norm belongs to culture and presents 
the attributes of the relative and the particular.’ Others, such as Geertz (1973) and Weber 
(1905), have preferred to focus on the problematic aspect of culture rather than on its definition, 
and regard man's condition with reference to culture as that of ‘an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun’. Therefore, they consider the analysis of culture to be ‘not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretative one in search of meaning’. 
Further elements towards the understanding of culture have been provided by psychoanalysis, 
including the influence of the unconscious life on creativity (Freud, 1964), the connection 
between social organisation and the control of sexual drives (Freud, 1930), studies on the 
universality of myths and symbols (Jung, 1990) and the deep interconnection between language 
and the unconscious (Lacan, 1968). Unconscious cultural patterns are manifested both on the 
individual and social level, for example, the style of self-expression as well as social habits and 
customs.  
3.2  Measuring and classifying culture 
In the first half of the 20
th century social anthropology has developed the conviction that all 
societies, modern and traditional, face the same basic problems, and that only the answers differ. 
Therefore, a defined set of issues (or dimensions) appeared to identify common basic problems 
across all cultures and affect the functioning of societies, of groups within societies, and of 
individuals within groups.  
On this basis, several scholars have attempted to identify the cultural dimensions (a dimension 
being ‘an aspect of culture that can be measured relative to other cultures’ (Hofstede, 1991) and 
to measure differences across cultures. Different models exist. We will focus on two recent 
ones: Hofstede’s and Trompenaar’s. Even though these models derive from research in 
corporate cultures, the dimensions they cover serve as a framework to analyse differences and 
similarities in other cultural settings. 
Hofstede (1980): culture as the programming of the mind  
Hofstede defines culture as the collective programming of the mind, which distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from another.  According to Hofstede, culture is 
learned and is a product of our social environment. The author makes a distinction between 
culture, human nature and personality.  Human nature represents the universal level in the 
‘operating system’ which determines one’s physical and basic psychological functioning (the 
ability to feel, the need to communicate, the need to play and exercise, etc.).  Culture mediates 
our physical and psychological functioning as it tells us what to do with our experiences and  26 
 
how to express or interpret them.  The personality of an individual constitutes the unique set of 
mental programming, which is not shared with another individual.  Personality is formed by 
biological traits (genes) and our unique personal experiences.  
 
In his view, Hofstede classifies cultures according to 4 dimensions.  These dimensions give an 
insight on how national cultures affects values and behaviour: 
 
1.  Power distance (high, low):  refers to the degree which members of a group accept 
hierarchy.  Contrary to low power distance, high power distance cultures tend to accept 
inequality in status and power in societies 
2.  Uncertainty avoidance (high, low):  shows how far cultures tolerate ambiguous   situations 
and uncertainty about the future.  Contrary to low uncertainty avoidance, high uncertainty 
avoidance cultures tend to be intolerant about uncertain situations. 
3.  Individualism vs. collectivism:  describes the relationship between individuals and the 
groups they belong to.  Individualists (‘I’ identity) emphasise self-realisation and individual 
goals, while collectivistics (‘we’ identity) emphasise in-group’s goals and fitting into the 
group. 
4.  Masculinity vs. femininity:  analyses how sex roles are differentiated, and deals with the 
values associated to them.  Contrary to feminine cultures, masculine societies give greater 
value to achievement, work, to differences between men and women. Feminine cultures 
emphasise quality of life, service and interdependence. 
5.  Long-term orientation: the extent to which people accept and expect immediate 























Table 3.1  Hofstede's Dimensions 
 








North America (USA) Individualism  Low  Medium  Masculine 
Japan Collectivism  and 
Individualism 
High and Low High  Masculine/feminine 
Europe: 
Anglo 










Collectivism High  High  Medium  masculine 
Nordic Medium/high 
individualism 
Low Low/Medium Feminine 
Latin Europe  Medium/high 
individualism 
High High  Medium  masculine 
East Slavic  Collectivism  Low  Medium  Masculine 
China Collectivism  Low  Low  Masculine  feminine 
Africa Collectivism  High  High  Feminine 
Latin America  Collectivism  High  High  Masculine 
Source:  www.pittstate.edu/mgmkt/culture.html 
Table 3.2  Cultural Dimension Scores For Ten Countries 








USA     40L  91H  62H  46L 
Germany     35L  67H  66H  65M 
Japan     54M  46M  95H  92H 
France     68H  71H  43M  86H 
Netherlands     38L  80H  14L  53M 
Hong Kong     68H  25L  57H  29L 
Indonesia     78H  14L  46M  48L 
West Africa     77H  20L  46M  54M 
Russia     95H  50M  40L  90H 
China     80H  20L  50M  60M 
H= high  M= medium  L=low 
Source:  www.pittstate.edu/mgmkt/culture.html 
Trompenaar’s model (1990):  the layers of culture 
For Trompenaars (1999), culture is a product of the interaction among people and it ‘is the way 
in which a group of people solves problems and reconciles dilemmas’. Trompenaars visualises 
culture as an ‘onion’ with different layers: the outer layer represents the visible products of 
culture. This layer is also called the explicit culture and it constitutes recognisable and 





The layer of values and norms is more difficult to identify as it is found deeper in the onion. 
Both values and norms can give us conscious or unconscious directions on how to behave. 
While norms give us a distinction of right versus wrong, values give us an indication of what is 
good or bad. The third and last layer is that of basic assumptions.  This layer represents our 
implicit norms and values, which are taken for granted and form part of our unconsciousness. 
This layer represents what is obvious and unquestionable, what is considered an absolute truth 
and form part of our intrinsic views of the world. 
Trompenaars develops 7 dimensions of culture: 
2.  Universalism vs. Particularism: refers to what extent cultures adscribe more value to 
general rules (universalism) or emphasise relationships above rules (particularism). 
3.  Communitarianism and Individualism: Both dimensions are complementary and refer to 
how individuals and group relate to each other. 
4.  Neutral vs. emotional: cultures differ in the way in which they express emotions. Neutral 
cultures carefully control and subdue feelings, while emotional (or affective) cultures reveal 
more easily their feeling verbally and non-verbally. 
5.  Specific vs. Diffuse: cultures differ in the way people get involved with each other and 
‘mix’ personal (informal) relationships with formal roles. Specific –oriented cultures 
separate the personal and the formal roles. Diffuse-oriented cultures tend to accept a 
mixture of the two. 
6.  Achievement vs. adscription: refers to how status is accorded based on achievements and 
doing (achievement status) or accorded to other traits such as age, class, gender, education 
(adscribed status, based on being rather than on doing). 







7.  Sequential vs. synchronic time
10: cultures differ in the way time is managed and 
perceived.  Sequential time orientation sees time as a sequence of events and synchronic 
time cultures see time as a combination of simultaneous events. 
8.  How we relate to nature
11. Cultures differ in the way they believe that they can and should 
control nature (inner-directed) or in they way they coexist with nature with minimal 
influence on it (outer-oriented cultures). 
Table 3.3  Trompenaar’s Cultural Dimensions  
   





















Canada  96      81   53   83     
USA   95   40   89   55   89   79  
UK   90   71   92   47   75   66 
Australia   93      96   43   81   70  
China   48      28   26   35   64 
Hong Kong   56   55   66   29   69   69 
India   59            72    
Indonesia   47   75   48   27   73    
Japan   67   83   83   28   56   60 
Malaysia   55      64          
Pakistan         75      84    
Philippines   69                
Singapore   67   42   56   34   58   50 
South Korea   26         28      49 
Thailand   63      60      71   50 
Source(s):   Understanding Cultural Dynamics:  www.forum.learningspace.com 
Note(s):    Sequential vs. synchronic time not included.  
3.3  Cultures and the economy 
Classical writers in economics, such as David Hume (1848), Adam Smith (1776), John Stuart 
Mill (1847), realised and discussed about the importance of institutions, such as firms, families, 
contracts, markets, rules and regulations, and social norms to economic development. Weber 
(1905) identified the protestant ethics as one of the roots of the surge of capitalism.  
However, throughout much of the 20
th century, mainstream economics traded breadth for rigor  
and cultural factors have been largely neglected.  
                                                       
10  Hall (1959) also elaborated on the concept of time orientation:  people develop temporal patterns, which define when it is 
appropriate to do certain things and how many things it is appropriate to do at the same time.  In general, the concepts of 
monochromic time (people tend to do one thing at the time) and polychronic time (people engage in several activities at the same 
time) are used to refer to these patterns or orientations.   For monochromic people time is a linear progression, which is measured as 
an exact entity.  For polychronic time cultures, time is seen as a holistic entity and the emphasis is placed in the activities occurring 
rather than on the clock time itself (Gudykunst, 1997).  Kluckhon and Strodbeck (1961) also elaborated on the concept of time.  To 
them, cultures differ in their focus on time based on their orientations to the present, the future or the past (Usunier 1996, Gudykunst 
1997). 
 
11  This parameter is based on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s (1961) person-nature orientation, which considers this relationship at 
three levels:  mastery of nature, subjugation to nature and harmony with nature (Mead 1998, Hoecklin, 1995).  30 
 
 
Cultural factors appear to play a larger role in the writing of economic historians. Concluding 
his economic history of last 500 years (Landes, 1999), David Landes writes that ‘If we learn 
anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes all the difference’ 
(p 545), suggesting that the European sense of progressive time, the existence of open 
institutions, and the attitude towards innovation gave the European a definitive advantage on 
other civilisations in the run to economic development.  
This conclusion is not uncontroversial (see Frank, 1998) and a hot debate is currently in course 
amongst historians. 
Here we do not enter into that debate and discuss how cultural values may affect long-term 
economic growth. 
However, we would like to highlight four different levels at which the influence of culture on 
economic growth can be seen to operate:  
•  Culture intended as a body of knowledge tends to coincide with scientific knowledge. In this 
sense the accumulation of scientific knowledge is parallel to the underlying scientific 
progress. Thus culture is intended as a body of comparable information and theories that 
develop in a progressive and cumulative way, and in this sense it can be said that a single 
scientific ‘culture’ exists. Similarly then, it can be said that there are as many cultures as 
there are the scientific fields and homogeneous communities of scientists and scholars. From 
this point of view, culture and development could be said to be two sides of the same coin. 
But culture differs from knowledge in that it is not empirically discovered or analytically 
proven; 
•  Culture/cultures are fundamental in the process of defining and creating values. A value is, 
of course, anything of value, given by its merit and importance, and culture is a process of 
attribution of value. As such, culture is fundamental in directing the course of economic 
growth. Indeed, culture as a process of attributing values leads to norms of behaviour and 
(self)-imposed codes of conduct.  These values, norms and codes of conduct provide an 
incentive structure for the economic transactions.  As an incentive structure, culture can 
reduce enforcement costs.  Given that an economic actor will move to produce or acquire 
that to which value is attributed, culture as code of conduct can be used as a measure to 
interpret and understand the rational/irrational behaviour of economic actors;  
•  Culture is a powerful instrument in the shaping of both individual and community identities. 
From an economic perspective, different cultural identities can be said to correspond to 
different  market sectors. This is true insofar as culture can be considered to be a more 
progressive, and in this sense modern, instrument to shape identities than race and ethnicity, 
because in a way cultural identities are much more flexible and rapidly evolving than racial 
or ethnic identities. This means that cultural identities are more liable to change and evolve 
in accordance with the market-oriented development of modern societies, with its 
continuously shifting models of belonging and identification. The passage from biological to 
cultural identity is, in a way, a passage from the concreteness of reality to the lightness of 
symbols. It goes without saying that if the values of identification undergo a continuous 
process of transformation and therefore have to be considered weak, transient and fleeting 
(as stated by post-modernists and theorists of the pensiero debole), the mechanisms of 
identification involved do not necessarily produce equally weak, renegotiable and revocable 
identities. On the contrary, by reaction, they may result in rigid and simplified identities 
which are opposed to any kind of evolution or transformation.   31 
 
•  The fourth dimension concerns the cultural domination of developing countries on the part 
of Western countries, as a by-product of economic domination. From this perspective the 
Western world is seen as imposing its culture on developing countries (cultural imperialism), 
thus carrying out an even greater form of exploitation. This interpretation has recently been 
challenged by the concept of globalisation
12, put forward by sociologists in order to better 
consider the nuances and complexities of the relationship between the economic and cultural 
dimensions of global flows, rather than merely assuming that cultural domination is an 
almost automatic consequence of economic domination. Most conceptions of globalisation 
posit that global processes of cultural homogenisation always met with resistance (Scott, 
1997), and take into account the significance of migration and diasporas in the 
transformation of national cultures in a new global age (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and 
Perraton, 1999). Appadurai’s (1990) contribution has been particularly enlightening 
regarding the ‘fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture and politics’. Taking into 
consideration the complexity of the modern world, he provides a vivid picture of 
globalisation as the result of the interaction of a number of disjunctive flows: ethnoscapes, 
mediascapes, technoscapes, finanscapes and ideoscapes. (Appadurai’s1990, p296). 
3.4  Cultural diversity, citizenship and multicultural societies 
Especially for Europe, diversity and citizenship represent two key issues in the years to come:  
1.  The process of enlargement of the European Union implies the development of contacts 
between different cultures. Will the EU choose to have a common culture or will the EU 
prefer a multicultural regime, made up of a mosaic of nations?  
2.  The immigration of non-Europeans is demonstrating  to European countries how difficult it 
is to reconcile the universal conception of citizenship and the multi-ethnic character of 
Westerner societies. In France, the debate in 1989 concerning the Islamic veil has provoked 
the following a debate: was it necessary to protect the cultural difference of the pupils? Was 
it better that all the citizens respect the principle of secularism of the school? These 
questions arise more and more as the globalisation of the economy contributes to the 
movement of the populations. 
3.  In all the Western countries, more and more groups are searching for identity. They demand 
official recognition of their religious or moral convictions, their cultural specificity, their 
ways of life, their sexual practices, etc. They demand specific rights and/or a political 
autonomy.  
History of modern migratory movements, in the 19
th and the first half of the 20
th centuries, 
offers several examples of the significance of ethnic and cultural diversities. Up to the last 
decades of 19
th century, both governments and migrants had the scope of minimising ethnic and 
cultural diversity between the receiving society and the immigrants. Overseas migration from 
Europe to Americas has clearly been manifested in two flows: one, towards North America, of 
Anglo-Saxon origins; the second concerns Latin origin languages speaking populations, sailing 
from Europe to South America. Since 1880, the international labour market was unified by 
connecting the two sections. This standardisation occurred in USA in order to support the more 
important diversity between Asian and European immigration. Chinese immigration (forbidden 
in 1880) and Japanese immigration (forbidden in 1905) are considered incompatible with the 
American way of life and its cultural foundations. Asian immigration (‘kanaka’ from 
Melanesia) was treated in a similar way during the same period by the Australian government. 
                                                       
12 See Key-Word 5 Globalisation.  32 
 
The debate on this subject was renewed during the first years of 20
th century, when diversity 
appears once again as a result of ‘new immigration’ from countries of Southern and Eastern 
Europe, in opposition to ‘old immigration’ from United Kingdom, Scandinavia and Germany. 
Immigration policy of USA tried to establish a new kind of diversity, based on a certain degree 
of formal educational level of the migrant (literacy test), required for the admittance in USA. 
Diversity and citizenship today 
Today’s debates about culture no longer concern the acknowledgement of equal dignity between 
different cultures. The notion itself of culture clearly conflicts with racist and evolutionist 
theories. It allows researchers to give the same value to all forms of human organisation. In this 
sense, cultural relativism was a great scientific and media success. This success can be partially 
explained by the guilty conscience of the West after the 2nd World War and in the process of 
decolonisation 
Nowadays most Western societies recognise the need to promote pluriculturalism through the 
implementation of programmes and policies aimed at fostering, protecting or even promoting 
cultural diversity. However, the current debate on pluriculturalism has all but shed light on the 
definition of ‘culture’. While it has been claimed that every homogeneous group has a culture of 
its own and that, therefore, culture should be ranked alongside terms such as ‘race’ and 
‘ethnicity’ in identifying the various groups making up homogeneous communities, the same 
difficulties encountered with the definition and use of the concepts of ‘race’ and ethnicity are 
also found in establishing the boundaries of individual cultures and of the various subgroups 
making up each culture. 
The contemporary use of the word ‘culture’ is itself sometimes ambiguous. The stress on 
universalism has also become an alibi for western hegemony. The notion of cultural relativism 
can be dangerous: if the membership of a culture is considered in absolute terms, the dialogue 
between different cultures becomes difficult to handle. Cultural relativism can become an alibi 
for nationalism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism. For example, the membership of the Serbian 
culture can justify the fact that the Serbian do not want to share their territory with another 
culture. The absolutism of cultural differences raises a problem: Can individuals who belong to 
different cultures live together in a common space? Does the acknowledgement of the variety of 
cultures imply denying the universal or the communication between different communities?  
How can we respect cultural membership and establish a common political space at the same 
time? In particular, how much importance should be placed on cultural memberships in 
multicultural societies? These two questions characterise the today’s intellectual debate. This 
intellectual debate revolves around universalism and ‘différentialisme’, monoculturalism and 
multiculturalism.  
Three major strands of thought characterise the current debate. 
The liberals (Allan Bloom, Benjamin Barber, Souza’s Dinesh) are universalistic and 
individualistic. They think that respect for the individual is more important than respect for the 
community. According to them cultural differences should stay in the private sphere. It is 
necessary to promote common, universal values rather than to protect community values.  
The communautarians (Michael Sander, Alasdair Mac Intyre, Amitai Etzioni) are collectivist 
and particularistic. According to them, the state should protect the interest of communities 
because they are threatened by individualism and by the dominant culture, which thinks that its 
cultural choices have universal worth.  33 
 
Today, the most influential thinkers (Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Will Kimlicka) have 
an intermediate point of view: they think that the malaise of modernity and the defects of the 
economic liberalism are the cause of group‘s demands. According to these thinkers, the 
principle of equity should take the place of the principle of equality: the state must help a 
community when its culture is threatened. But this help must not cause damage to another group 
or person: for example, in Western countries, the state does not permit polygamy (even though 
polygamy is part of Muslim culture) because it maintains that polygamy harms women. 
The European discourse has considered multiculturalism as a typically North American practice. 
In France, it is said that the role of the State is to integrate different groups into the same 
society. Actively multicultural policies are considered dangerous because they provoke a 
division of the society into separate groups. The situation is changing a little: the religious and 
cultural associations that protect group identity were given official status in 1981. Group 
languages and regional languages are starting to be taught.  
Opposition between universalism and particularism, monoculturalism and multiculturalism, 
between citizenship and tradition may lead to a dead end. Debate is moving on in considering 
the fact that, if it is true that the idea of a citizen without social ties is an illusion, it is also true 
that individuals are not locked into their culture of origin. The content of a group’s culture is not 
static. It is dependent on history and evolves. The culture of origin is one of the numerous 
resources that individuals can use in a ‘do-it-yourself’ cultural identity. Instead of wanting to 
protect or to liberate oneself from the culture of origin, it can be read as an important factor of 
change, creativity and invention.  
The demands of ethnic groups are now replacing class struggle and the denunciation of social 
and economical exploitation. At present, social policies are separated from multicultural 
policies. These two aspects are often connected together. People who undergo cultural 
discriminations often undergo social and economical injustices too. Furthermore, the 
recognition of a culture does not imply the end of its social and economical exploitation. It may 
be necessary to connect the policies of cultural recognition and the policies of economical 
redistribution (see Key-Word 7 Conflict). 
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4.  COMMUNICATION 
4.1 Definition 
In the 15
th century, communication is almost synonymous with communion, meaning: to share. 
Today, communication refers to the process of intentionally stimulating meanings through the 
use of symbolic information (Jandt, 2001). According to Samovar and Porter (1988) 
communication is: 
‘a dynamic transactional behaviour-affecting process in which sources and receivers 
intentionally code their behaviour to produce messages that they transmit through a channel in 
order to induce or elicit particular attitudes or behaviours.  Communication is complete only 
when the intended message recipient perceives the coded behaviour, attributes meaning to it, 
and is affected by it’.   
 
According to Gudykunst and Yum Kim (1997), the meaning attached to a message depends on 
the form, the channel, the physical environment, the situation, the relationship and the kind of 
interaction that takes place between individuals. Based on this assumption, they state that 
messages can be (always) transmitted, but meanings cannot. 
 
Contrary to Jandt and Samovar and Poter, Gudykunst and Yum Kim point out that intention is 
not a necessary condition for communication.  Intention is the way we instruct ourselves about 
how to communicate.  Because communication occurs when someone gives meaning to her or 
another person’s behaviour, it is not necessary for an individual to transmit a message 
intentionally in order to communicate. 
 
Following Oomkes (2000), it is necessary to distinguish the terms communication  and 
information. In communication, there are always signals, which are symbolic and refer to a 
particular experience/reality. Information in itself is the recognition of the symbols of which it is 
made, without necessarily making any link to its contextual meaning. It means that information 
becomes communication when we attach certain meaning to it in a certain context.  
4.2  Communication and our societies 
Communication has become a fashionable subject. Indeed, it is one of the fields where 
technology made, in recent years, has made the greatest progress. These new technologies play 
a role in many aspects of our daily life, at least in our industrialised countries: work, family life, 
leisure, etc. This reality concerns everyone and modifies habits. 
Discussing communication means immediately thinking of tools, instruments, communication 
technology. Why? Because it is the principal feature, the most striking feature that differentiates 
our own, as well as our parents and grandparents way of communication. They send letters, we 
phone, we send e-mails. Letters need days, sometimes weeks, to reach their destination; but 
with internet, in a few seconds, we can address messages to the other end of the world. We can 
communicate with people whom we do not know, meet people from a distance and access to an 
extraordinary amount of information. 
All this is possible because we have machines to do it, we have technology.  
But behind any technology, there is a science, that is to say a speech, a philosophy, some world 
views, a culture or an ideology. In other words, invention, conception, realisation and use of  38 
 
these technologies implies a spirit, a certain way to contemplate reality, to decide what is real 
and what is not. This vision of the world is expressed in the most rigorous way by the science 
that regards technology: cybernetics, the science that allowed for the invention of 
communication technologies. It has been developed in the middle of the 20
th century by N. 
Wiener’s, a US mathematician. This science, first applied to machines, soon exported its 
method into life and the social sciences. 
At the same time, social sciences were making language as their priority subject. In short, 
during this period, we can distinguish two trends: structuralism in France, and theories of 
language in United-States. Structuralism, which was interested in language and narrative 
structures, is in part neglected today.  
Theories of communication 
Under the two influences of cybernetics and structuralism, the so-called theories of 
communication were developed, more pragmatic and above all better suited to new technologies 
than structuralism itself. Theories of communication prevail largely in actual knowledge of 
human relationships, and dictate most of choices. They are the work of anthropologists, 
psychiatrists, sociologists gathered around what is now called «Palo Alto school» (the most 
famous: G. Bateson, P. Watzlawick, E. Goffman). 
Theory of communication takes, as the name indicates, considers communication as an 
explicative principal of all human fact. But in communication, as explains P. Watzlawick, it is 
no longer more energy, but information which is transmitted. That is the essential difference 
between Freudian psychodynamic and theory of communication when it explains human 
behaviour (H, Beavin, D. Don Jonson, P. Watzlawick, Pragmatics of Human Communication, 
1967).  Life of human groups does not consist in expense of energy, but in circulation of 
information. The great discovery of theory of communication, applied to human systems, is its 
possibility to explain any behaviour without requiring vital energy but only, as in cybernetics, 
the notion of « information ».  
This theory was, and still is, interesting because of the apparent easiness of its application. It 
allows statement of relatively simple rules and schematic representation; it makes possible 
immediately a pragmatic action, a practical application, for example within the context of 
therapy. 
Nature and body seem to let themselves handle and transform without great resistance by our 
sciences and technologies. In the fields of culture and human psychology, theories of 
communication tried to find a comparable efficiency. Researchers tried to find techniques able 
to transform, for example, pathogenic situation, and these techniques are sometimes similar to 
simple « tricks ». 
So, theories of communication were elaborated abandoning the ancient notion of ‘energy’. Not 
only the notion of ‘energy’, but also all those that go with it: strength, life, movement, material, 
impulse, desire. These notions (sometimes a bit obscure) were trendy among researchers at the 
end of the 19th century and at the very beginning of the 20th century. We find it in philosophy 
(Nietszche), or in psychoanalysis (Freud). In the tradition of its time, one of founders of 
sociology, E. Durkheim (1858-1917) describes a world animated by strength, movement, 
energy, life. He studies dynamic aspects of these phenomena and he sees society as the most 
powerful beam of physical and moral strength we can see in nature (‘le plus puissant faisceau de 
forces physiques et morales dont la nature nous offre le spectacle’ (Durkheim, 1937, p 621) 
Society is a system of active strength, a movement.   39 
 
Focusing on communication while searching in it an explicative principal of social phenomena, 
we focus on an exchange of information and we give up viewing relationships as expressions of 
life, confrontations of strength.  
Communication is a recurrent preoccupation in western culture and it takes an important place 
in our social running. However, other words could be more useful: speaking, speech, or word 
(« he’s a man of his word »), talk (in French: la parole). These words characterise a deeper 
reality. Speech serves to communicate, but it has many other uses too. It can do good or evil, it 
can cure or kill, it can be hesitant or authoritarian, playful or serious. It goes with each human 
tiny event. 
Nothing but technologies’ level stands in the way of a faster and faster communication. But 
speaking needs time, because some speeches are fast (like chattering) but others are rare (like 
confession). Media dreams of continuous communication. Speaking needs silence. The only 
quality for communication is clarity of the message, the free flow. Speaking has a vast number 
of qualities. 
Speaking is an act, it has effect, it implies effort, wile. Thinking about communication, we must 
always remember that, behind this notion, there are individuals speaking. When a man meets 
another man, they talk. But talking is not only to exchange information, it is not only to 
communicate. Communication can interest sociologist if he looks for, behind the notion, 
speaking and acts. 
4.3 Models  of  communication 
Linear (transmission) models of communication 
Traditionally, transmission models of communication were concerned with the technical 
efficiency of communication channels for carrying information.  These models demonstrate how 
ideas, feelings, attitudes, emotions and information are transmitted from one person or group to 
another (Windhal,1992)  
Shannon and Weaver's (1949) model visualized communication as a sequential process and was 
designed to account for differences between sent messages and received messages (Fiske, 1988; 
Mac Quail, 1994) In this model, communication is presented as a linear and simplified process: 
 





In this model (as in any other), one can identify at least 5 elements of communication:  the 
source, the receiver, the message, the channel and noise.  Here the idea is that there is a sender 
(source), who encodes a message and transmits it intentionally to a receiver through the use of a 
Figure 4.1: Shannon and Weaver’s model of communication  40 
 
channel (or medium).  The receiver decodes the message, assigns a certain meaning to it and 
responds to the sender. The noise or interference can affect the channels that transmit the 
message. 
The focus of this model was on 1) the accuracy in the transmission of the symbols (technical 
problems), 2) the precision of the symbols when conveying the desired meaning (semantic 
problem) and 3) the effectiveness of the meaning in affecting conduct (effectiveness problems).  
Lasswell (1948) presents a verbal version of Shannon and Weaver’s original model.  Lasswell’s 
model focuses on who says what, in which channel and with what effect?  The application of 
this model is specific to mass communication and replaces meaning for ‘effect’.  The main idea 
behind this model is that changing one of the elements (encoder, message, channel) will change 
the effect on the communication.  
Gebner’s ‘general purpose model of communication’ (1956) adds two new dimensions to 
Shannon and Weaver's linear model: the perceptual dimension and the means and control 
dimension. 
The perceptual (or horizontal) dimension involves the process of selection. That is matching the 
external stimuli with the internal patterns of thought or concepts (Fiske, 1998). The creation of 
meaning is derived from this matching, which at the same time is controlled by culture. This 
means that individuals with different cultural backgrounds will have different perceptions of 
reality. 
The means and  control (or vertical) dimension involves the relationship between form and 
content. Here the focus is in finding the best form to communicate certain message/content.  
The relationship form-content is inseparable and it’s interdependent (dynamic and interactive). 
This means that there is no content without a form. 
Newcomb’s model (1953) was the first to introduce the role of communication in a society or a 
social relationship. For Newcomb, A and B are both communicator and receiver and they 
constitute individuals, groups or organisations. X is part of their social environment. ABX 
(represented in a triangle) is an interdependent system in which each part influences each other.  
If one part changes, then the other two will change as well. 
4.4  Communication and multicultural environments: an organising 
model for studying communication with strangers 
Gudykunst and Yum Kim (1984) isolate and identify the elements influencing our 
communication with strangers (people who are members of different groups and unknown to 
us). This model sees communication as an interactive process (transmitting and interpreting 
messages) influenced by different conceptual ‘filters’: cultural, sociocultural and 
psychocultural.  These filters influence one another and permeate the interaction.  
 
According to this model, the environment
13 is not a closed system, since most communication 
takes place in a social environment where others also communicate.  
 
 
                                                       
13 Context is another term used for the environment in which communication takes place and which helps to define the 
communication (Jandt 2001). Hall (1976)   makes a distinction between high context communication or message (most the 
information is in the physical context or internalised in the person) and low context (most of the information is in the explicit code). 
To Hall (1976), without the context, the code is incomplete since it emcompases only part of the message. 41 
 
 
T= Transmitting I = Interpreting
 
 
Transmitting and interpreting messages is seen as a simultaneous process.  The ‘filters’ 
influence the process of transmitting and interpreting messages as they give us ‘leads’ on what 
to expect from the interaction.  The filters also influence what we pay attention to (selection 
process) and how we choose to interpret the received messages. According to Gudykunst and 
Yum Kim all of us have a preconceived notion of what communication is about and how it takes 
place. This preconception also affects the way we interpret communication.  
Cultural influences are values, norms and rules.  Sociocultural influences refer to racial and 
ethnic groups, families, age groups, service and occupational groups, ideological groups, etc.  
Psychocultural influences refer to stereotypes, attitudes, ethnocentrism, etc. and finally, 
environmental influences refer to geographical location, climate, architectural setting and 
perceptions of the environment. 
 
4.5  Communication, economic growth and diversity: the concept and 
role of knowledge spillovers 
Communication is very important for growth. Difficult to measure for economists, it is none the 
less an important variable to explain the development of cities, regions and countries.  
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Figure 4.2: An organising model for studying communication with strangers  42 
 
Historians and sociologists such as Jacobs (1969, 1984) and Bairoch (1988), observed that that 
most innovations happen in cities, and concluded that the opportunities that individuals have in 
cities to meet each other help them to get ideas and innovate (Jacobs, 1969). Marshall (1890) 
discusses the transfer of knowledge in an occupation to explain the existence of industrial 
clusters. 
Economic theory has formalised this idea into the concept of ‘knowledge spillover’: the 
knowledge of one individual spills over into other individuals and improve other people’s 
productivity. The word ‘spillover’ is used because the interactions are not mediated by price 
mechanisms. Knowledge spillovers therefore imply externalities: investment in owns 
knowledge not only improve owns productivity, but also other individuals’.  
Knowledge spillovers have a key role in two major strands of economic research. 
Firstly, knowledge spillovers are a key factor in theories attempting to explain unbounded 
economic growth. In fact, endogenous growth theories view externalities (and particularly 
externalities associated with knowledge spillovers) as the ‘engines of growth’ (Romer, 1986; 
Lucas, 1988. See Key-Word 1 Development and growth).  
Secondly, knowledge spillovers are a key factor in the theories attempting to explain the 
existence and growth of cities. Without knowledge spillovers it will be difficult even to explain 
the existence of cities. Lucas (1988) expresses the idea very well: ‘A city is simply a collection 
of factors of production: labour, capital and land is always far cheaper outside the city than 
inside. Why capital and labour do not fly outside? (...) Of course people like to live near shops 
and shops need to be located near their customers, but circular considerations of this kind 
explain only shopping centres, not cities. Cities are centred on wholesale trade and primary 
producers, and a theory that accounts for their existence has to explain why these producers are 
apparently choosing high rather than low cost modes of operation.’ (Lucas, 1988, p 319). The 
only force that can keep individuals within the cities is the opportunity to learn from others’.  
This two research strands are strongly interrelated, to the extent that knowledge spillovers are 
stronger within cities than outside cities, cities are ‘engines of growth’ themselves, as Jacobs 
(1969) and Bairoch (1988) suggested. 
Despite their importance, knowledge spillovers remain a black box. Theories have assumed 
their existence in order to explain certain facts of life, such, as discussed above, economic 
growth and the existence of cities, and the theoretical implications of the assumptions fit nicely 
with empirical evidence. However, the way they work and the extent to which they contribute to 
the final results is not clear. 
Knowledge spillovers:  the role of diversity 
Since Marshall (1890), knowledge spillovers have been widely discussed in the literature on 
cluster and cities. With respect to the view that they have on the role of diversity, those theories 
can be grouped in two main groups. 
The first strand argues (Marshall (1890), Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986)) that the 
concentration of an industry in a city helps knowledge spillovers between firms and, therefore, 
the growth of that industry and of that city. Through spying, imitation, and rapid interfirm 
labour mobility, ideas are quickly disseminated among neighbouring firms within the same  43 
 
industry. Porter (1990) presents in this sense a similar view, arguing that specialised, 
geographically concentrated industries stimulate growth
14.  
The second strand has an opposite view. Unlike MAR and Porter, Jacobs (1969) believes that 
the most important knowledge transfers come from outside the core industry. According to 
Jacobs, it is the variety and diversity of geographically proximate industries rather than 
geographical specialisation that promotes innovation and growth.   
Glaeser et al (1992) test prediction of these theories analysing a data set on geographical 
concentration and competition in 170 of the largest US cities over the period 1956-87. In a 
dynamic setting, they test in which cities industries grow faster, as a function of geographic 
specialisation and competition. Their results confirm Jacob’s view: diversity positively affects 
growth. 
In a recent paper, Peri and Urban (2001) examine the impact of multinationals on the 
productivity of domestic firms in Italian and German provinces and find that the impact is larger 
the larger the initial gap in productivity between investing and local firms. These findings 
confirm that heterogeneity between different producers operating in the same economic 
environment can be a powerful source of learning.  
Diffusion of technologies does not only take place through spillovers, but also through 
deliberate choices and there might be obstacles in adopting technologies which are different 
from those traditionally used by local firms. Several contributions have linked the choice of 
technique to the human capital or skills already available in a given industry or firm (Benhabib 
and Rustichini, 1991; Chari and Hopenhayn, 1991; Keller, 1994; Jovanovic and McDonald, 
1993; Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1995 and 1996). According to these works, the more skills are 
specific to a given technique, the more costly it is to switch to and from that technique.  
Jacobs (1961) sees diversity (see Key-Word 1 Growth and development) as the key factor of a 
city’s success. While recognising to industrial diversity (Jacobs, 1961, p. 138) a key role, she 
also suggests that the variety of commercial activities is probably linked to other types of 
diversity: variety of cultural occasions, aspects, inhabitants, visitors and also variety of tastes, 
abilities, needs and even obsessions (Jacobs, 1961, p 137).  
Jacobs’ view is consistent with the idea that there is a role for cultural diversity in promoting 
growth and innovation.  
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Schotter (1981) defines an institution as a regularity in social behaviour that is agreed to by all 
members of society, which specifies behaviour in specific recurrent situations and that is either 
self-policing or policed by some external authority.  This approach stresses the fact that 
institutions are, to use a game theoretical framework, self-enforcing equilibrium outcomes. 
North (1990, 1991) defines institutions as the rules of the game –both formal rules (laws) and 
informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct) and 
their enforcement characteristics, that shape human interactions. He further states that 
institutions create order, reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, and provide an incentive 
structure in the economy. This approach stresses the fact that institutions represent constraints 
on human actions and behaviour. 
A similar approach is used in Kasper and Streit (1998) who define institutions as ‘rules of 
human interaction that constrain possibly opportunistic and erratic individual behaviour, 
thereby making human behaviour more predictable and thus facilitating the division of labour 
and wealth creation’. They range from formal constraints (or external institutions, such as 
constitutions, laws, rules, regulations) to informal constraints (or internal institutions, such as 
values, norms of behaviour, customs, taboos, attitude). Institutions are shared in a community 
and are always enforced by some sort of sanction, either explicitly or implicitly. Institutions 
without sanctions are useless.  Only if sanctions apply will institutions make the actions of 
individuals more predictable. Rules with sanctions channel human actions in reasonably 
predictable paths, creating a degree of order. If various related rules are consistent with each 
other, this facilitates the co-operation between people, so that they can take good advantage of 
the division of labour and human creativity. The word institution thus refers to a broader 
concept than the word organisation.  Institution refers to an organisation and to the expectations 
that the existence of the organisation entails for individuals’ expectations about other people’s 
behaviour.  Organisation and expectations are two main interrelated institutional components.  
5.2  External and internal institutions 
Internal institutions 
How do institutions come into existence?  One possibility is that rules and entire rule systems 
are shaped by long-term human experience. People may have discovered certain arrangements 
that allow them to better meet their aspirations.  Useful rules will become a tradition and will be 
perpetuated, if adopted by sufficient numbers of people to create a critical mass, so that they are 
followed community-wide. The rules will be spontaneously enforced and emulated as they 
gradually emerge and become known throughout a community. Arrangements that fail to satisfy 
human aspirations will be rejected and discontinued. Thus, most of the rules that matter to our 
daily lives develop within society in an evolutionary process of gradual feedback and 
adjustment. And the precise content of most institutions will evolve gradually along a steady 
path. In analysing how internal institutions come about, institutional economics draws 
frequently on the insights of moral philosophy, anthropology, psychology and sociology (and 
even Darwinism). 
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External institutions 
Other types of institutions come into existence because they are designed, are made explicit in 
legislation and regulations and are formally enforced by an authority outside society, such as a 
government.  For example, such rules can be designed and imposed by agents who are selected 
by a political process and who act from outside the society as such.  They are ultimately 
enforced by legitimated means of coercion, for example through the judiciary.  As soon as 
institutions are imposed externally by rulers, parliaments or bureaucracies, a fundamental 
problem arises, namely that the political agents, who should act in the interest of the citizens, 
may tend to exceed their mandate and use rules and rule enforcement for their own benefit.  For 
this and other reasons, political processes themselves need to be subjected to certain rules. 
The effectiveness of external institutions depends greatly on whether they are complementary to 
the internally evolved institutions: for example, whether legislation supports a society's 
morality, its cultural conventions, customs and manners.  
5.3  Institutions and the economy 
In economics there have been several approaches to model economic agents’ choices and the 
functioning of the economy as a whole.  A well-known approach is the neo-classical approach: 
facing scarcity of resources, all individuals make choices that reflect their preferences and 
maximise the individual welfare. Exchange occurs in the ‘market’. The market provides a signal 
to the individuals through prices. Price signals are the mechanism that allocates resources into 
the most profitable use. 
In the neo-classical model there are no ‘institutions’ except for the market. Coase (1960) even 
showed that when there are externalities (when one persons’ actions or behaviour affect another 
persons’ well-being), the creators and victims of externalities can internalize them by private 
contracts. This will result in an efficient use of resources and thus externalities can be corrected 
by the market, provided that property rights are defined and that there are no transaction costs. 
Coase’s theorem influenced the neo-classical view of non-market institutions. It is only when 
the market mechanism cannot reach an efficient allocation of resources (e.g. when property 
rights are ill-defined) that non-market institutions (e.g. state regulations) can play a role.  In 
other words, non-market institutions are a response to market failures and are inversely related 
to market imperfections. This view lends support to the idea of non-market institutions as 
substitute for markets. 
New institutional economics attempts to provide insight into those non-market institutions.  As 
many resources in our economies are closer to common property rather than exclusively owned, 
new institutional economics drew the attention to the importance of property rights, rules, and 
regulations that need to be defined and enforced. Property rights, rules, and regulations, 
determine economic performance through their impact on (reduction of) transactions. 
New institutional economics attempts to explain why institutions that produce poor economic 
(and political) performance can emerge and persist. 
Game-theoretical analysis applied to institutions has shown that in many strategic situations 
there are multiple (both efficient and inefficient) equilibria, implying that outcomes are not 
uniquely pre-determined. In particular, the following points are worth mentioning (Aoki, 1996). 
1.  Interdependence of institutions and coherence of institutional arrangements 
Games played in the economy are inter-linked from the most local (trade) games to the most 
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multiple games.  Thus viable institutions in the economy may be mutually inter-dependent.  
Also, once selected, an institution may become sustainable because of sunk costs (costs that 
cannot be recovered), even if the initial conditions allowing for the emergence of the 
institution disappear. 
2.  Sub-optimality of institutional arrangements 
Since exogenous parameters do not uniquely determine the selection of the equilibrium (and 
thus of the institutional arrangements), there is no guarantee that institutional arrangements 
are efficient. The adoption of efficient institutional arrangements can be hindered by 
institutional path dependence. 
3.  Path dependency 
Which path will be selected may depend on historical/geopolitical accidents, expectations 
and equilibrium play in the game below the explicit organizational level (cultural beliefs and 
value). 
4.  Gains from cross-economy institutional diversity 
Since a universal institutional arrangement (e.g. neo-classical complete markets) does not 
exist, there are gains from a diversity of institutional arrangements across economies that 
may be made available from trades, mutual learning, institutional transplants. 
5.4  Culture and institutions: two inter-linked concepts? 
‘Culture’ and ‘institutions’ are overlapping and interdependent concepts. 
On the one hand, if we accept the definition of institution as the rules of the game – both formal 
rules (laws) and informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes 
of conduct), it is possible to classify culture as a form of institution.  
On the other hand, faced with different possible institutional arrangements, cultural and social 
factors impact institutional selection. Greif (1994, 1995) studies the Maghribi and Genoese 
traders of the late medieval period and concludes that that different cultural heritages led to 
diverse trajectories of societal organisation (led to different institutional arrangements).   
‘Distinct cultures provided different focal points while distinct social processes provided 
different initial networks for information transmission among the Maghribi and the Genoese 
traders, leading to the emergence of distinct institutions in fundamentally the same situation.’ 
(Greif, 1995, p. 20). 
Cultural beliefs are one important component of culture.  ‘Cultural beliefs are the ideas and 
thoughts common to several individuals that govern interactions – between these people, and 
between them, their gods, and other groups – and differ from knowledge in that they are not 
empirically discovered or analytically proved’(Greif, 1994, p. 915). 
Intuitively we can understand that cultural beliefs will affect economic outcomes (see Key-
Word 2 Culture).  However, the analysis of how cultural beliefs interact with institutional 
arrangements is not obvious.  The work of Greif has suggested that cultural beliefs provide 
linkages among games. In other words, cultural beliefs affect decision making in subsequent 
strategic situations. 
Classical game theory does not treat much about linkages among games or about mappings 
from an equilibrium in one game to that of another game.  Yet Greif has found, after an 
unexpected change in the rules of a game, the selection of the equilibrium in that game to have 
predictable relations with the equilibrium that prevailed prior to the change.  In particular, 
expectation associated with past equilibria were a good predictor of the expectations that  49 
 
prevailed following an exogenous change in the rules of the game. In other words, these 
expectations became a cultural element- cultural beliefs - as they transcended the original game 
in which they had been crystallised.  These expectations then become the initial conditions for 
selection of a strategy in subsequent games.  The cultural beliefs co-ordinate expectations and 
provide focal points for the selection of a new equilibrium. 
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6. GLOBALISATION 
“In the Cold War the most frequently asked question was: How big is your missile? In 
globalisation, the most frequently asked question is: How fast is your modem?”, Thomas 
Friedman- The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999) 
6.1 Definition 
The term globalisation was used for the first time in 1968 by Marshall McLuhan in his famous 
book War and Peace in the Global Village. Analysing the role of television in the unfolding of 
the events linked to the war in Vietnam, McLuhan showed how the media in the 1960s had 
begun to play an important part in current affairs by shaping public opinion, and more generally 
predicted the decisive role which modern communication technologies were to play in the world 
in the acceleration of progress. 
The word was taken up again by Theodore Levitt in 1983, in his article The Globalisation of 
Markets, to describe the vast changes which have taken place over the past two decades in 
international economy with the convergence of world markets
15. According to Raghavan (1995), 
the term globalisation “is also being used synonymously for 'liberalisation' and 'greater 
openness' of economies – implying both liberalisation of the domestic economy and external 
liberalisation.”  
Advances in transport, communications and information technology are a determining factor in 
the globalisation process. On the subject, Mr Renato Ruggiero, former WTO chairman and ex-
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs - speaking at the Telecom-95 to heads of the major 
telecommunications enterprises of the G-7 countries -  said that while “liberalisation of capital 
and trade flows is creating a global economy, the liberalisation of telecommunications, which 
can bring high quality, medical, education and business services to every village in the world, 
will globalise human society itself.” 
The pre-eminent role of information in the globalisation process has also contributed to the 
concept's being gradually extended from the economic sphere to several political, sociological 
and cultural phenomena, and one which affects several areas, including human rights, 
citizenship, democracy, local and global identities, multiculturalism and the “clash of cultures”. 
It follows that globalisation implies a world system in which different cultures are 
interconnected on several levels. In this sense Held (1991) describes globalisation as “the 
intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that 
local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa”. 
The process of globalisation does imply the profound restructuring of economic and labour 
markets and consequently of political systems. Suffice it to consider the effect that the 
liberalisation of the economy is having in the countries of the Eastern block and China. The fall 
of the Berlin wall triggered a complete reorganisation of social and political equilibrium, the far 
reaching consequences of which are still unforeseeable. The collapse of the previous system has 
left a situation of political instability in the Balkans and former Soviet Union, with the result 
that dramatic conflicts have flared-up, although the feared-for mass invasion of Europe on the 
part of millions of migrants from the East never happened. 
                                                       
15 In Latin countries the term mondialisation is also often used in lieu of globalisation (Nadoulek, 2001) and although some authors - 
particularly in the Francophone world - distinguish between the two, attributing a more critical meaning to the first, etymologically 
speaking they are synonymous, and in our opinion there does not appear to be enough evidence that a very clear distinction between 
them can be made.  51 
 
Along with these political changes, the debate embraces a wide range of issues, attracting 
considerable attention from media and public opinion. Worries concern raising inequality across 
countries in the world, the exploitation of human resources, the cultural homogenisation, 
pollution, exploitation of natural resources and the sale of unsafe products.  
6.2  Globalisation in a historical perspective 
The great debates over crucial aspects of contemporary reality have always evoked the problem 
of historical precedents. The same happened also for the discussion around globalisation.  
If the term globalisation is relatively new, the historiographic concept closest to globalisation is 
to be considered the “world-economy”, different from the “world economy” (without hyphen). 
Braudel (Braudel, 1979) takes as examples antique Phoenicia, Rome, Christian Europe, Islam, 
China, India as demonstration of globalisation under the form of empires. 
Recently, Jacques Le Goff discussed the ancient forms of globalisation (Le Goff, 2001) using 
the example of the Roman empire. Indeed, Romans had the impression that they were 
expending their dominance to the entire inhabited world, so was the idea of mondialisation or 
globalisation. The Roman empire was seen as the government of this world: “ecumene”. Rome 
dominated this empire during centuries and brought peace to it, often obtained by war. It also 
spread the feeling of being part of a “universal citizenship” amongst some inhabitants of this 
Roman space and brought the formation of a juridical space with its own rules and laws. This 
form of globalisation is also at the origin of several problems: the one of the language 
unification is an example we are still aware of today with the domination of English. Moreover, 
“Romans” or “globalised Romans” were often unable to integrate new citizens in their space 
which lead to an exploitation or even an expulsion of these “barbares” or “anti-global citizens” 
as we might call them nowadays. Other, more recent examples of world-economy include 
Sixteenth Century Mediterranean, Russia until Peter the Great, Turkish Empire until the end of 
Eighteenth Century. 
Some key concepts arise from the historical analysis: 
•  Network: globalisation tends to create networks and build on them to prosper. 
•  Development: globalisation implies a certain form of evolution and is a phenomenon which 
conquers spaces and societies. For example, colonisation of America not only brought a 
catastrophic result on health of “globalised” population by diffusing alcohol, diseases, 
microbes and perturbing the previous biological equilibrium, but also in a second period, 
developed hygiene and medicine practices (particularly true in Africa). In many cases, 
mondialisation also brought the diffusion of school, education, and to a certain level, 
knowledge.  
•  Communication: the tendency to globalise is stimulated by techniques and tools of 
communication (see section 4 on Communication).  
•  Success: in the phenomenon of globalisation there exists an idea of success, or of creating 
something (an idea, a religion, a juridical system, etc.) to succeed.  
On a more negative side, there are also two big flaws linked with globalisation: 
•  Rape and destruction of previous cultures. The example of religion which is an important 
component of globalisation is striking: globalisation has taken a universal character with 
religions which often slides towards intolerance and persecution.  52 
 
•  Globalisation exacerbates the opposite situation between poor and rich. Impoverishment is a 
bad which has almost been unavoidable during globalisation. Mondialisations have raped 
not only cultures but also history. As an example, many cultures were considered “poor” 
because based on a non-written history and have therefore been completely cancelled out. 
In particular, three characteristics summarise the world-economy: 
•  Occupation of a certain geographical space, subject to breakage and sudden widening: the 
Fifteenth-Sixteenth Centuries great geographical discoveries; post-1989 Russia; the recent 
China widening; 
•  A centre, represented by one or, for a certain period, two dominant cities (before the 
exclusion of one of the two poles): Rome, Alexandria, Venice, Genoa in the second-half of 
Fourteenth Century; London and Amsterdam in Eighteenth Century; 
•  A division into concentrical areas: centre, semiperipherical areas, periphery. 
Braudel (1979) argues that “in every globalisation, there are four essential aspects (or orders): 
an economic aspect, a social one, a cultural aspect and a political one”. Albeit current debate 
appears to identify the economic forces as the key driving forces of globalisation, Braudel 
stresses the fact that older globalisation started essentially as political constructions and not as 
economic ones (for example China and India and their dependant countries).  
Consistently with the objectives of ENGIME, we focus here on the economic (measured by 
trade, nations increasingly trade with each other) and cultural (measured by communication: 
individuals increasingly communicate with each other at increasingly longer distances) 
dimensions of globalisation. 
6.3  The economic dimension of globalisation 
In its economic dimension, globalisation is traditionally measured by the ratio of world trade to 
world GDP (i.e., the more international trade, the more globalisation). The measure captures the 
degree to which national economies exchange goods with each other. An alternative measure 
used in economic literature is given by the ratio of world foreign direct investment to world 
GDP. In this case, the stress is on flows of capital. In both cases, the variables capture the 
degree to which national economies are integrated. 
Section 6.2 discussed earlier globalisations. In fact, there is still no consensus on when and how 
modern process of global integration started. 
Flynn and Giráldez (1997) reckon that modern globalisation was “born” in the 1570s, by which 
time trade linked Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, Kevin O'Rourke, of 
Trinity College, Dublin, and Jeffrey Williamson, from Harvard University, agree that European 
trade with the rest of the world boomed after 1500. It rose by about 1.1% a year over the next 
three centuries, probably faster than GDP. The history of the progressive fusion between the 
different forms of world-economy takes up from Fifteenth to Eighteenth Century. This history 
occurs through a sequence of “decentralisations” and “re-centralisation” of the different world-
economies: 
•  Second-half of XIV century: polarisation on Venice; 
•  1500: decentralisation from Venice to Antwerp; 
•  1550-1560: re-centralisation on the Mediterranean Sea (Genoa); 
•  1590-1610: decentralisation from Genoa to Amsterdam;  53 
 
•  1780-1815: decentralisation from Amsterdam to London; 
•  1914-1929: decentralisation from London to New York. 
With British economy and empire arising, the first real jump towards globalisation – understood 
as a coincidence between world-economy and world economy – was completed (Braudel, 1977; 
Wallerstein, 1974; Id., 1980; Id., 1983). 
From 1815, all the indicators show an unprecedented growth in commodities and productive 
factors mobility on world scale: foreign trade development; raising of an international labour 
market in the shape of international migrations, basically related to non-transferable underused 
fixed factors (natural resources); international capital transfers. 
This early economic world scale unification needed an international payment system (gold 
standard) rationalising the former precious metals flows from West to East (from Americas to 
Europe and from here to Asia) as a payment for a reversed commodities flows from East to 
West (XVI-XVIII Centuries). In turn, the Gold Standard further fuelled exchanges, side by side 
with a parallel process of foreign trade multilateralisation (commercial treaties with the most 
favoured nation clause: a GATT/WTO forerunner system)
16. 
Chart 6.1 below shows world exports relative to world output from 1850 to 1975. It appeared 
that globalisation (as measured by world trade) started to be significant after WWII even 
thought there were spurts of globalisation before this date –in particular, in the 1920’s before 




                                                       
16 It has to be noted that, aside with this kind of capitalist unification between XV-XVIII Centuries, with a certain advance and also 
delay with respect to economic chronology the world microbiological unification went forward (XIV-XIX Centuries: plague and 
cholera above all) (Le Roy Ladurie, 1973). This kind of unity, based on biotic exchanges, bases itself on a more basic unity, which 
gives account of the simultaneous character of some great economic cycles on a world scale: the long-period climate changes 
(Braudel, 1967; Le Roy Ladurie, 1967; Id., 1970). 
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Recent debate on globalisation has focused on the relationships between globalisation and the 
income divide between rich and poor countries. Recently, economist have started to look 
empirically at those relationships. Dollar and Kraay (2001) identify a group of developing 
countries that have seen the largest increases in trade and significant declines in tariffs over the 
past 20 years as the “globalisers” and compared their economic performances over 1980-2000 
with those of the developing countries that remained closer to external trade (“non-globalisers”). 
Chart 6.2 below shows that growth rates of “globalisers” have accelerated since the 1970’s even 
as growth in the rich countries and the rest of the developing world has declined. This evidence 
would suggest that increasing economic integration is bringing about less inequality across 
countries. 
 
6.4  The cultural dimension of globalisation 
A current criticism raised against globalisation concerns the dangers of cultural homogenisation 
and of destruction of local and national identities implied in the globalisation process, seen as a 
new form of cultural imperialism imposed by the West through economic domination.  
Chart 6.2: Real per capita GDP growth in rich and developing countries, 1950-2000
Source: Dollar and Kraay, 2001 55 
 
Indeed, there are some signs that diversity is diminishing. Up to half of the approximately 6,500 
languages now spoken are already endangered or on the brink of extinction, and linguists 
estimate that a language dies somewhere in the world every two weeks. Much of the remaining 
linguistic diversity is carried by small communities of indigenous and minority people. Some 
even predict that we may lose over 90% of the world’s languages during the next century. 
Already more than a quarter of the world population (1.7 billion people), now speak English. 
However, many scholars are convinced that the globalisation process already contains within it 
the seeds to counteract this kind of action, in that a dialectic tension exists between the global 
and the local, and the process in itself tends in any case to reproduce diversity. In addition, the 
globalisation process would allow the emergence of local identities, previously suppressed in 
the name of national homogeneity. “… the conceptual language which would capture the culture 
of the capitalist world -economy is a task yet to be undertaken. (…) (globalisation) Does it 
imply cultural homogenization, cultural synchronization or cultural proliferation? What does it 
say about the direction of cultural flows? Is it the interaction of the local and the global, with the 
emphasis on the former, or vice versa?” (King, 1998). The latter hypothesis is reinforced by the 
conventional wisdom in trade theory suggesting that openness will lead to specialisation and 
geographic fragmentation of economic activities. Moreover, we observe that global cities are 
melting pots of cultures, languages, economic activities.  
Despite the hot debate, many questions still remain open: 
•  Which forces in the on-going globalisation process tend to preserve cultural diversity or, on 
the contrary, to induce cultural convergence? 
Several mechanisms may be at work here. For example, increased trade integration with other 
countries may affect over time the evolution of preferences and cultural traits of domestic 
individuals and lead to preferences’ convergence of the participating countries. Secondly, the 
structure of “role models” young generations are exposed to may affect cultural dynamics.   
Innovation and diffusion of  information technologies make information faster to diffuse. 
Individuals geographically far apart from each others are becoming more exposed to new ideas, 
new ways of thinking and behaving. That effect may considerably enlarge the set of “role 
models” people are exposed to and local cultural dynamics. Thirdly, transport costs of people 
are reduced and migration increases. With enhanced facility to move across regions and 
countries, individuals are more likely to get in contact with other individuals with different 
cultural traits. This is going to affect intraregional as well as interregional cultural dynamics. 
Recent theoretical work and models on population dynamics, social interactions and cultural 
transmission (Bisin–Verdier 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Brock and Durlauf, 2000) have investigated 
how cultural traits do evolve in a population of individuals because of intergenerational cultural  
transmission, social interactions and socialisation processes. These models integrate aspects of 
evolutionary anthropology, statistical physics and economics. At the current stage, they provide 
useful insights to understand elements driving the dynamics of individual preferences and the 
persistence of cultural diversity or homogenisation.  
•  Will these forces themselves feed back on the process of  globalisation?  
We have seen above how the process of globalisation has the potential to affect cultural 
dynamics. In turn, cultural dynamics fostered by the globalisation may feed back into the 
process of globalisation itself. Some examples are discussed below. 
Firstly, potential trade conflicts in the “cultural industries” may set it and feed back into cultural 
dynamics. For example, the expansion of US movie, music and TV production into Europe may 
cause a reaction in those industries at the European level, triggering a revival of European  56 
 
activities and cultures. In the same way, the cultural perception of migrants by natives may 
trigger a renaissance of local (as well as migrants’) culture and identities.   
Secondly, deeper and deeper international integration means that countries start now to 
negotiate on harmonisation of new instruments like regulations, standards and norms which to 
some extent do reflect at the local level differences of social and cultural preferences. The 
persistence of cross country differences in these preferences may feed conflicts against the 
process of  globalisation itself (e.g., anti-globalisers civil society  movements).   
Trade, cultural and migration policies appear to be more and more interdependent. 
What will be the impact of this for Europe? Are trade and migration policy complements or 
substitutes to cultural policy? How should one think about the organisation of global 
governance taking into account the constraints implied by cultural dynamics? In turn, is there 
some kind of cultural policy which may help alleviate problems generated by trade policy? 
Obviously, the extremely significant role played by the media in this new context cannot be 
overlooked, along with the risk of the possible manipulation of information on the part of 
increasingly powerful multinational companies owned by individuals who are not controlled 
politically. On the other hand, the increasing availability of information concerning the world 
situation, with its areas of injustice and violation of human rights, can serve to stimulate 
growing awareness and responsibility in this respect on the part of the world community. Again, 
also in this context the opportunities offered by globalisation should not be underestimated, in 
that it entails an even more active social and political participation in which the responsibility of 
every citizen extends well beyond the boundaries of their local community or country, and 
extends to the entire planet. In this sense globalisation really does imply the blurring of 
boundaries, rendering obsolete the idea of nation states as separate political units. 
In this context mention should also be made of the role of migration flows in increasing the 
interaction of peoples from different countries - thus forcing the redefinition of the idea of 
citizenship itself - and in producing new and emerging phenomena such as the new ethno-
national Diaspora. Globalisation, therefore, also brings with it the need to deeply rethink many 
of our traditional categories, such as those of ethnie and state “For quite some time the nation 
state has been regarded as a norm of state formation, that is to say, as the final stage of an 
ethnie's political autonomy and achievement. Currently, however, in the age of globalisation 
and transnational connections, the nation state ideal may be regarded as a special case of the 
relationship ethnie-state” (Westin, 1998). 
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7.  SOCIAL CAPITAL AND TRUST 
7.1 Definition 
The origin of the concept of social capital can be dated back to Jacobs (1961), or even to 
Banfield (1958), who attributed the underdevelopment of Southern Italy to the lack of social 
trust outside the strict family circle. More recently, social capital was defined independently by 
Pierre Bourdieu and James Coleman in the 1980s, as being ‘the social ties or membership of 
particular communities that made resources, advantages and opportunities available to 
individuals’. Bourdieu’s analysis focused on the benefits accruing to individuals by virtue of 
participation in groups, and on the deliberate construction of sociability for the purpose of 
creating this resource.  He defined the concept as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’.  His definition makes clear that social 
capital can be broken into two elements: first, the social relationship itself that allows 
individuals to claim access to resources possessed by their associates, and second, the amount 
and quality of those resources. 
Perhaps the most influential formulation of the concept of social capital, nevertheless, is that of 
sociologist James Coleman.  Coleman defines social capital as ‘a variety of entities having two 
characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they 
facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure …’.  He used the example of 
Jewish diamond merchants of New York to illustrate the concept.  The merchants were able to 
have their diamonds appraised through their local networks without the need to resort to costly 
legal contracts to safeguard against being cheated, because of the strength of the dense ties 
between their community members and the ready threat of exclusion if trust was violated.  Thus, 
the traders were able to increase their economic advantage because of their social networks. 
Recently Putnam has popularised the concept of social capital as ‘features of social life - 
networks, norms and trust - that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue 
shared objectives’.  This formulation has been tremendously influential in the spate of empirical 
work that has appeared over the last few years.  This work, particularly among political 
scientists and economists, focuses on the relationships among associations, trust and other 
attitudes and norms, or, alternatively, between one or both of these sets of variables and social, 
economic and political outcomes. 
Trust may be defined as ‘… the belief that the other party will not show opportunistic behaviour 
in vulnerable circumstances’.  Opportunistic behaviour is here interpreted as in a game theory 
context (the prisoner's dilemma) i.e. ‘self-interest with guile’. 
In a modern market economy innumerable transactions take place everyday.  Quite often the 
underlying contracts are incomplete, which makes the parties vulnerable: one party may cheat 
on the other.  A high level of interpersonal trust is supposed to reduce enforcement and 
transaction cost. Laws and rational behaviour are not enough to ensure a properly functioning 
market economy.  At least a minimum reservoir of trust, moral standards and reciprocity must 
prevail.  Given the resources of an economy (physical capital, human capital, natural 
endowments, technology, …) trust allows a more efficient use of these resources, thus 
increasing its economic performance.  Trust may be viewed as a lubricant of the market system. 
A distinction can be made between bonding and bridging trust. Bonding trust is generated by 
(intensive) contacts between people of the same family, tribe, class, ethnic group or local 
community.  Bridging trust is more general and abstract and requires no personal acquaintances.   60 
 
Bridging trust may be enhanced by education, participation in associations and contacts with a 
correct government and civil service. 
Different authors disagree on the precise relationships between social capital and trust. Jacobs 
(1961) defines social capital as ‘neighbourhood networks’, while Putnam (1993) as ‘feature of 
social life – networks, norms and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively 
to pursue shared objectives’. Coleman (1990) see trust as a product of social capital, while 
Fukuyama (1995, 1997) equates trust with social capital 
In the mid-nineties the World Bank launched the Social Capital Initiative on defining, 
monitoring and measuring social capital with the triple objective of 1) assessing the impact of 
initiatives to strengthen social capital on project effectiveness; 2) demonstrating that outside 
assistance can help in the process of social capital formation; and 3) contribute to the 
development of indicators for monitoring social capital and methodologies for measuring its 
impact on development. The initiative seems to favour the Putnam approach stressing horizontal 
associations (networks of civic engagement, the church society) and trust in institutions and 
among people.  
Of particular interest here is the set of indicators that the Initiative has developed for empirical 
studies (Table 7.1) . Indicators of horizontal associations take a microperspective and typically 
have been collected for analysis within a country.  The other sets of indicators have been 
calculated at the national level and have been used in cross-country research. 
Table 7.1:  Social capital indicators (World Bank) 
Horizontal associations 
Number and type of associations or local 
institutions 
Extent of trust in trade unions 
Extent of membership  Perception of extent of community 
organisation 
Extent of participatory decision-making  Reliance on networks of support 
Extent of kin homogeneity within the association  Percentage of household income from 
remittances 
Extent of income and occupation homogeneity 
within the association 
Percentage of household expenditure for 
gifts and transfers 
Extent of trust in village members and 
households 
Old-age dependency ratio 
Extent of trust in government   
 
Civil and political society 
Index of civil liberties (Gastil, Freedom House)  Index of democracy 
Percentage of population facing political  Index of corruption 
      discrimination  Index of government inefficiency 
Index of intensity of political discrimination  Strength of democratic institutions 
Percentage of population facing economic  Measure of "human liberty" 
      discrimination  Measure of political stability 
Index of intensity of economic discrimination  Degree of decentralisation of government 
Percentage of population involved in separatist  Voter turnout 
      Movements  Political assassinations 
Gastil's index of political rights  Constitutional government changes 
Freedom House index of political freedoms  Coups 




Indicator of social mobility  Other crime rates 
Measure of strength of "social tensions"  Prisoners per 100,000 people 
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation  Illegitimacy rates 
Riots and protest demonstrations  Percentage of single-parent homes 
Strikes Divorce  rate 
Homicide rates  Youth unemployment rate 
Suicide rates   
Legal and governance aspects 
Quality of bureaucracy  Repudiation of contracts by government 
Independence of court system  Contract enforceability 
Expropriation and nationalisation risk  Contract-intensive money (currency/ M2) 
 
7.2  Social capital, trust and the economy 
Putnam (1993) identifies the stock of social capital as a determinant of institutional 
performance across northern and southern Italian regions. He suggests that the different stock of 
social capital could also have contributed to the differences in economic development patterns 
across the two groups of regions. Trust, co-operative norms and associations within groups fall 
within the definition of social capital he uses. According to Fukuyama (1995, 1998), the well-
being of nations depends on the size of the reservoir of trust: ‘one of the most important lessons 
we can learn from an examination of economic life is that a nation's well-being, as well as its 
ability to compete, is conditioned by a single pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust 
inherent in society’.  
The main reason underlying this conclusion is that quite often contracts are incomplete, which 
makes the parties vulnerable: one party may cheat on the other.  A high level of interpersonal 
trust reduces the enforcement and transaction cost. Laws and rational behaviour are not enough 
to ensure a properly functioning market economy.  At least a minimum reservoir of trust, moral 
standards and reciprocity must prevail.  Given the resources of an economy (physical capital, 
human capital, natural endowments, technology, …) trust allows a more efficient use of these 
resources, thus increasing its economic performance.  Trust may be viewed as a lubricant of the 
market system. (Fukuyama, 1995).   
Some efforts have been made in the economic literature to strengthen the theoretical framework 
and to find empirical support to these ideas. La Porta et al. (1997) document a remarkable 
correlation between the trust prevailing in a country and the presence of big corporations. Knack 
and Keefer, (1997) and Temple and Johnson (1998) have tested the relationships between trust 
and norms, civic co-operation and economic growth, largely confirming the suggestion of 
Putnam (1993). Guiso et al (2000) find close correlation between the degree of social capital 
and that of financial development across Italian provinces. 
The question of how to re-build social capital in regions of poor economic performance and low 
levels of trust has not yet been tackled by the literature. Even seminal work on the topic, 
including that of Putnam and Coleman, tentatively avoid the task of addressing policy measures 
in the reconstruction of productive social capital where amoral familism, individualism and 
criminality have prevailed. The difficulty in addressing such issues lies in the dynamics of a 
vicious cycle of perverse social capital, that tends to reproduce and institutionalise practices of 
familism, individualism and criminality. Nevertheless, there are regional and urban case studies  62 
 
emphasising the possibility and means of reversing such dynamics and re-building productive 
forms of social capital (Fox, 1996; Heller, 1996).  
Despite the intellectual appeal of the concepts of trust and social capital and the relative strong 
impact they had on the political and cultural debate, they have being strongly criticised (mainly 
by economists) because of the scarce empirical content and weak theoretical foundations 
(Solow, 1995). Putnam (1993) admits that the mechanisms through which ‘the norms and 
network of civic community contribute to economic prosperity’ need further investigations.  
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The broader definition of conflict defines it as being a serious disagreement or argument. It can 
be a prolonged armed struggle, a state of mind in which a person experiences a clash of 
opposing wishes or needs or a serious incompatibility between two of more opinions, principles 
or interests. 
The interpretation of conflict, and therefore the role attributed to conflicts within a society, has 
gone from two opposite extremes: At one end, conflict is a social pathology, which alters the 
equilibrium and harmonious development of social life, thus prioritising the avoidance of 
conflicts; at the other end, conflict is the expression of a positive interaction between individuals 
and social groups.  
 
At the basis of these positions is the unresolved dispute of whether a society should be 
conceived as an orderly mechanism, in which everything occurs smoothly, according to a well 
established plan, or society should be viewed as a place in which individuals act on the basis of 
their own free will and creativity, remaining respectful of others. It follows that the latter 
includes conflicts as a natural part of human interaction, leading to a state in which conflict is 
actually the creative germ of society, nourishing the possibility of freedom and invoking the 
need for a rational system of control and domination (R. Dahrendorf, 1971). 
 
It is not easy to draw a line between those who consider harmony and equilibrium implicit to the 
functioning of a society for which conflicts present a threat, and those for whom conflict is not 
only the norm in society, but a catalyst for positive changes therein. Some general categories, 
however, can be devised, and usually Comte, Spencer, Pareto, Durkeim are listed in the former 
group, and Marx, Sorel, Stuart Mill, Simmel and Dahrendorf in the latter. 
 
Two theoretical strands may be identified within the group claiming conflict as a positive 
expression within societies—Marxists and liberals (Stuart Mill). According to Marx (Il 
Manifesto, 1848), class conflict is a powerful political instrument through which dramatic social 
change may occur, whose outcome as the subversion of class conflict inherent to the capitalist 
system, brings about social equality. On the other hand, liberals emphasise the value of conflict 
as a key element of healthy political life, the necessary proof of the capacity to exercise 
freedoms in society, whose absence is often interpreted as an expression of coercion on the part 
of the State. 
On another token, conflict can be defined as an extreme form of competition where contenders 
seek to disable or destroy opponents or even convert them into a supply of resources. Conflict 
needs not always to be violent but can take the form of industrial or legal conflicts. In a world of 
business, a firm might find ways of sabotaging competing enterprises without actually 
assassinating their executives. Nevertheless, warfare serves well as a convenient metaphor for 
strife and contention generally (Hirshleifer, 2001). Examples of conflictual interactions are 
“hot” and “cold” wars
17, lawsuits, strikes, redistributive politics and family rivalries. 
In his “Manual of Political Economy”, 1927, Pareto wrote: “The efforts of men are utilised in 
two different ways: they are directed to the production or transformation of economic goods, or 
else to the appropriation of goods produced by others” [1971 (1927), p. 341] 
                                                       
17 According to “The New Oxford Dictionary of English”, war is defined as: “a state of armed conflict between different nations or 
states or different groups within a nation or state”. Terrorism is instead defined as “the use of violence and intimidation in the 
pursuit of political aims”.   65 
 
This is the principle of the race: either you run faster, either you trip up your opponents. The 
first aims at producing more useful goods and services for exchange with other producers, the 
second tries to appropriate a larger slice of the existing production. In economics, the first way 
of making a living, i.e. technology of production has been widely developed, whereas the 
second way, i.e. technology of struggle has been given less attention. Nevertheless, references to 
wars and conflictual alterations do exist amongst classical references and specialised literature 
displays relevant developments.  
Conflict theory can help explain not only the size and shape of nations, but the outcomes of 
competition in all aspects of life: social classes struggles, political factions and ideologies, 
management and labour, contenders for licences and privileges (“rent-seeking”), plaintiffs and 
defendants in law suits, husband and wife, etc. 
Struggle and conflict are obviously costly and inefficient. Yet some observers have seen in the 
“conflict in Nature” that some conflicts can benefit the whole “system”: for example, the 
predator eliminating the infirm and the unfit, or male rams fighting for sexual access helping to 
improve the breed. Nevertheless, these types of conflicts on the human level are rarely 
benefiting all participants.  
Still, the concept of conflict viewed in a wider perspective includes several aspects, not all of 
which negative. On the one hand conflict is seen as a lack of harmony, which as such 
undermines a well-ordered society and should therefore ideally be eliminated. On the other 
hand, there is the conception of conflict as a necessary, and therefore positive, stage towards 
achieving a new order. This is the example of competition on the market, where conflicting 
interests can lead to a positive race which fuels growth.  
One of the most significant theoretical contributions in the latter sense, and that which has most 
influenced later thinkers in this respect, is Hegel’s philosophy of the state, much of which 
focuses around the idea of the opposition between the Finite and the Infinite, and of the 
dialectical thinking whereby conflict is the spring through which reality develops, passing 
through Thesis and Antithesis towards a Synthesis (negation as a creative force, which in turn 
can mean difference, opposition, reflection or relation). As such a conception implies that to 
cancel conflict is not possible, a well-functioning society therefore is one which is able to 
manage conflict effectively. 
This idea has influenced the thinking of both sociologists and psychologists, including Marx's 
class conflict theory and the idea of intra-psychic conflicts in Freud. 
However, one of the conflict theories developed from Hegelian philosophy which expresses this 
concept most stridently, is Carl Schmitt’s, according to which conflict is the essence of the 
political, as the very nature of politics stems in the opposition of “friends” and “enemies”.  
Conflict and its causes 
Historians and political scientists offer three traditional issues interpreted as “causes of war”. 
•  Is war due to the opportunities for material gain at the expense of weaker victims? 
•  Is war mostly due to hatred and hostility?  
•  Or is war mainly due to mistaken perceptions of the other’s motives or capacities? 
In particular, the materialistic theory attributes conflict to competition for resources. Barbarian 
invasions of civilised cities and empires in ancient times were motivated by consumables, 
slaves, etc. In contrast, attitudinal theories of conflict direct attention to the respective 
preference functions. The relative weights attributable to genetic versus cultural determinants  66 
 
attitudes towards conflicts is still an open question. Finally, informational theories of conflict 
emphasise differences of perceptions or beliefs. 
Three key elements emerge, which can be interpreted in an economic way as: preferences 
(hostile preference), opportunities (economic gain) and perceptions (mistaken perceptions). 
A rational individual taking a decision to engage in a conflict will be subject to those three 
forces. The decision-maker’s preferences, opportunities and perceptions will decide whether to 
engage in a conflict or not. In turn, preferences, opportunities and perceptions will themselves 
depend upon the some factors: 
•  Preferences (malevolence or benevolence) is likely to be a function of kinship and shared 
cultural heritage.  
•  Opportunities may depend on Malthusian population pressures, on economics of increasing 
returns, the division of labour and the possibility of enforcing agreements.  
•  Perceptions may be influenced by communications, and past and on-going demonstrated 
hostilities. 
Figure 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate how this three forces influence the decision
18.  
Axes represent the income of each individual (R and B). The curve QQ bounds the peaceful 
possibilities or the “settlement opportunity set”. PB and PR represent the parties’ respective  
perceptions of the outcome of the conflict. UR and UB are the utility curves or utility 
indifference contours. 
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Figure 8.2: Static of conflict – small potential settlement region 
 
The figure on top shows the case when settlement opportunities are complementary and 
preferences display benevolence on each side and perceptions of returns from conflict are 
conservative and agreed (PB and PR coincide). Individuals B and R are not concerned only with 
the maximisation of their own income but are concerned about the other’s well-being as well. 
They attached a positive utility to it and that’s why utility curves are convex. The potential 
settlement region , PSR, (shaded in the diagram) is the set of incomes such that both parties 
regard themselves as doing better by settling than by fighting. When it is large, it implies a high 
probability of coming to an agreement. It shows a case of “mutual benevolence”.  
The figure at the bottom is showing a case when each individual is willing to incur a material 
sacrifice to reduce the other’s income. In consequence the indifference curves have now a 
positive slope and are concave. The PSR is highly reduced and could be eliminated completely. 
This case is the case of “mutual malevolence”. 
Neo-classical economics tend to minimise the importance of such divergences. The modern 
analysis of conflict typically combining the theory of games with the rational-decision 
economics of choice is represented by three important economists. Schelling (1960), Boulding 
(1962) and Tullock (1974).  
8.2 Conflict  and  diversity 
According to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities ethnic conflict is one of the 
main sources of large-scale violence in Europe today (OSCE, 2000). Around fifty per cent of 
Italians reckon that the multiethnic coexistence will be source of social conflict (Corriere della 
Sera, 1999). Episodes of violence and intolerance related to the presence of cultural and ethnic 
minorities in cities are daily reported by newspapers. 
In conflictual interactions, it would be normal to expect the strong to grow even stronger and the 
weak weaker. But surprisingly often initially weaker or poorer contenders end up gaining on 
initially stronger or wealthier opponents. This is called “the paradox of power”
19. The key to the 
paradox of power is a simple economic point: while wealth provides the wherewithal for 
                                                       
19 Power here is taken to mean the ability to achieve one’s ends in the face of rivals.  
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successfully exploiting a poorer opponent, the initially disadvantaged group is typically 
rationally motivated to fight harder (Hirshleifer, 2001). In other words, non-conflictual or co-
operative strategies tend to be relatively more rewarding for the better-endowed side. This could 
explain some of the social conflicts arising in cities when immigrants are poorer than the 
nationals, and are seen as competitors for housing, jobs and social benefits (Kempen and 
Özüekren, 1998). For example, referring to riots in segregated northern towns in Britain in the 
summer of 2001, much of the Asian population in these towns came to Britain to work in the 
textile industry. Mill closures in late 1970’s early 1980’s induced unemployment and poverty in 
both the whites and Asian communities creating an atmosphere of envy about who was getting 
what from the public purse
20. Social conflicts may also arise when immigrants are seen as a 
threat to the alleged cultural homogeneity of the indigenous population (Faist and Häußermann, 
1996). 
Economic consequences of ethnic diversity and conflicts have been recently analysed in 
economic literature. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) analyse how heterogeneity of 
preferences across ethnic groups in a city influence the provision of public goods. Results show 
that the shares of spending on productive public goods are inversely related to the city’s ethnic 
fragmentation even after controlling for other socio-economic and demographic determinants. 
Ethnic diversity imply underprovision of public goods. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2001) analyse 
the economic effects of conflict (using the terrorist conflict in the Basque Country as a case 
study) and find that in the Basque Country GDP per capita is lower of about 10 percent points 
relative to a “synthetic” built control region. These gaps seem also to widen in response to 
spikes in terrorist activity (Abadie and  Gardeazabal, 2001)  
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The concept of governance is often opposed to that of government, where government is 
intended as ‘the complex of political institutions, laws, and customs through which the function 
of governing is carried out’ (Merriam-Webster), while a governance approach implies that 
conventional boundaries between politics, policies and administration become less significant 
than the question of how the whole ensemble works (or fails to work). In this sense governance 
is a broader notion referring to the act of running a government, state, regime, etc., that 
encompasses and transcends that of government, in that it is a process of management and 
control involving several actors, and specifically interaction between formal institutions and 
those of civil society. 
Governance may be viewed from two angles, in terms of effectiveness and of the results it aims 
to achieve and, from an ethical point of view, in terms of the fairness and inclusiveness of the 
process.  
From the first perspective, an effective political system – considered as any system in which 
supra-individual decisions must be taken and implemented – can lead to increased participation 
on the part of the actors involved in the decision-making process, and thus result in increasing 
citizens’ motivation as active members of the ‘community’. 
From the ethical point of view, the idea of governance is based on the principles of fairness and 
transparency that should imbue any bureaucratic or political procedure in a democratic society. 
‘The concept of 'democratic governance' is generally associated with the shift of power from the 
public to the private sector, with the strengthening of civil society, and with institutional 
reforms within the public sector. Thus, recent political theory has emphasised that democracy 
presupposes the existence of civil society as an autonomous sector, separate from both the 
administrative and the economic system, and characterised by a pluralism of actors, voluntary 
civic associations, and interest groups. The functioning of civil society, in turn, requires a 
pluralistic public sphere in which citizens, sharing only the commitment to a 'thin' consensus on 
procedural rules of discourse, are actively involved’ (Koenig, 1999) 
The European Commission's White Paper on European Governance lists five principles which 
should underpin good governance: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and 
coherence. 
By openness is intended the active communication to the public of EU activities and decisions, 
in understandable and accessible language. 
Participation is conceived as spanning the whole procedure from conception to implementation 
of policies, and depends on central governments following an inclusive approach. 
Accountability is achieved by having clearer roles in legislative and executive processes where 
each institution must explain and take responsibility for its role.  
Effectiveness means that policies should deliver what is needed on the basis of clear objectives, 
evaluation of future impact and, if possible, past experience. 
Coherence, a quality which will be all the more required throughout the European Union in 
view of the enlargement process, which will lead to an even increased diversity, should be based  70 
 
on political leadership and strong responsibility on the part of the institutions to ensure a 
consistent approach within a complex system. 
Therefore, as stated above, ideally good governance should aim to ensure a high level of 
participation, and a fair, transparent and effective decision-making and implementation process, 
contributing to raising the level of confidence. (European Commission, 2001) 
This seems by and large to agree with the definition of governance provided by the World Bank, 
according to which ‘good governance is epitomised by predictable, open and enlightened 
policy-making, a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos acting in furtherance of the 
public good, the rule of law, transparent processes, and a strong civil society participating in 
public affairs.’ (GDRC) 
9.2 Governance  and  Multiculturalism 
In accordance with the above definition the concept of governance obviously applies to a wide 
range of fields, not least the management of cultural pluralism. In this respect, the introduction 
of Governance of Cultural Diversity (Dacyl, Westin, 2000), published by the Unesco-sponsored 
network ‘Management of Cultural Pluralism in Europe’, describes governance of cultural 
diversity as the ‘organisational, functional and normative principles in the handling of cultural 
plurality in diverse societal domains and at various levels of human agency’. It goes on to 
explain that these principles can be assessed through a more ‘pragmatic, efficiency- and 
solution-oriented approach to the handling of spatial demo-linguistic diversity’, i.e. stressing the 
effectiveness of the process, or in terms of the intangible values it aims to promote (recognition, 
participation, equality, justice, etc.), therefore emphasising the democratic value of governance. 
While the first approach has been criticised as too business-like, it is also true that actual 
promotion of the core values mentioned needs in some way to be translated into action through 
tangible implementation procedures and structures.  
‘At the core of the argument about civil society is the belief that the polity benefits when there 
are a variety of well-functioning mediating structures situated among citizens and between 
citizens and their government. We are a highly diverse society and it only stands to reason that a 
rich, dense, and diverse set of mediating structures will work to broaden representation in the 
political process.’ (Ford Foundation, 1999) 
The  Charter of Principles for a Culturally Diverse Society, drafted by the Ethnic Affairs 
Commission of New South Wales in Australia in 1993, sets out some basic principles which 
should underpin multicultural societies: 
•  participation in all levels of public life;  
•  respect and accommodation of the culture, language and religion of others;  
•  the greatest opportunity to make use of and participate in relevant activities and programs   
provided and/or administered by state government;  
•  recognition and promotion of (…) linguistic and cultural diversity as an asset.  
At the same time, Australian state legislation acknowledges local government as a significant 
player in service provision for different ethnic and cultural groups and recognises the 
importance of promoting participation of minorities through effective consultative techniques. 
(Thompson, Dunn, 1998) 
This approach highlights two ideas of governance which bear great relevance to multicultural 
societies; first of all with regard to the needs transparent and open rather than unspoken rules  71 
 
and procedures and, secondly, concerning the need to take into account multiple points of view. 
Indeed, while in more culturally homogeneous and undifferentiated communities the interests of 
most of their members are likely to coincide, in multicultural contexts, where there is a need to 
reach a great diversity of people in the community, governance becomes essential in order to 
ensure the participation and inclusion in the decision-making process of people from diverse 
cultural backgrounds and to prevent discrimination. In this sense the adoption of a governance 
model is already a first step towards recognising changes and extending participation to newly 
emerging contexts. 
Increasingly heterogeneous and multicultural local communities, neighbourhoods, schools, etc. 
mean the convergence of a variety of social, political and cultural differences, along with 
diverse – and often conflicting – needs and requirements. To be effective in such contexts - that 
is to benefit the community as a whole and promote confidence and participation - governance 
models need to be based on transparent decision-making processes which are understood by all 
involved and which are as far as possible inclusive of the diverse components represented, 
through effective consultative techniques.  
In order to operate effectively, such systems require both a stable framework providing 
coherence and continuity, and a process which is sufficiently flexible to allow decision-making 
and implementation that take into account the changing needs of communities as they emerge 
from the consultative process with the various actors involved. ‘The ability to govern is no 
longer a uni-directional, hierarchical and monopolistic process flowing from public decision-
makers to citizens. The citizenship demands spaces for involvement and engagement of a new 
type, both in the definition of problems and policies and in the management of programmes and 
services; spaces which should conform to relational logics, in which the actors stop working as 
a function of formal hierarchies and contribute to the organisation of deliberative, non-
authoritative channels of the resolution for social conflict (Subirats, 2001) 
From the above two main issues emerge: first of all the need to reduce the distance between 
government and citizens through multi-level governance systems which bring the decision-
making process closer to the various actors involved; and, secondly, the need to involve 
communities - considered as networks of people sharing the same space and environment but 
not necessarily the same needs - in the process. It is hardly surprising that it is particularly 
authors from America and Australia who stress the role of local communities in implementing 
and fostering the political cohesion of a multicultural society. We don't think it is an 
oversimplification of the complexity of the political debate to state that an important element in 
this sense lies in the dimensions of these countries, and in the resulting physical and 
psychological distance of many of their citizens from their central government, which mean that 
the multi-level political hierarchy and local bodies which come to be created play a fundamental 
part in fostering and maintaining feelings of social participation on the part of local 
communities. For example, a few American cities have built neighbourhood-based participation 
systems, where it is assumed that ‘neighbourhood government will build a commitment to 
shared values which will make citizens more involved, more tolerant of those they disagree 
with, more trusting of the governmental process, and more educated about public policy. When 
these practical goals are translated into the discourse of modern social science, such systems are 
designed to promote ‘civil society,’ ‘civic engagement,’ and the creation of ‘social capital’.  
Europe is now facing these very issues as it undergoes the process of transformation of its 
political order, which places the centre of political decision-making even further than previously 
for many of its citizens. If, in this context, strategies implemented according to a governance 
model have a profound meaning in all sectors of policy-making, this is even truer in the  72 
 
symbolically highly-charged area of cultural diversity, as these obviously directly affect the 
composition and, consequently, the identity, of local communities.  
‘Multiculturalism will be an unavoidable dimension of European citizenship, since it would 
allow both for the inclusion of new cultural values, and therefore the shaping of value 
community (...) beyond national stories.’ (Dacyl, Westin, 2000) 
Another related issue which Europe faces in the area of governance concerns the need to 
harmonise migration policies. This is a delicate area in that individual nation-states must still be 
allowed to retain a measure of control over their borders, and which therefore requires the 
application of a multi-level governance model where all concerned parties, including the 
European central government and the nation-states have a say in the process, as well as any 
other actors, such as autonomous regions, which may be involved. These complexities are 
evident, for example, in the Spanish situation: ‘In Spain, analysing territorial complexity 
requires reference to two simultaneous dynamics: Europeanisation and territorialisation, 
understood, respectively, as displacements of government towards the European Union (EU) 
and towards autonomous communities (Acs) and local governments (LGs). Furthermore, both 
are projected to a greater or lesser extent onto differentiated dimensions of the political system: 
on the dimension of identities, institutions and actors (‘polity-politics’) and on the dimension of 
decision powers (‘policymaking’). (Subirats, 2001) 
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